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INTRODUCTION
Following the occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in 2016,
the struggle for control of federal public lands has been renewed in the public dis-
course. The relationship between private interests and the public interest in the
public's lands and resources is central to the debate. This Article analyzes this
question in both cultural and legal terms and proposes a reinvigorated public in-
terest standard and a framework for both management of private rights and the
conservation of public lands.
The Article begins its inquiry with an in-depth look at the forty-one-day long
standoff between armed militants and law enforcement officials at Malheur,
which means "misfortune" in French. The occupation of the Refuge ended with
one death and the prosecution of over two dozen individuals for trespass, destruc-
tion of government property, conspiracy, and related charges. It all began when
the Hammonds, who held grazing permits on Bureau of Land Management
("BLM") land adjacent to the Refuge, were prosecuted for starting fires on federal
land.1 The Hammonds' conviction for the incident might have been the end of the
story, but another notorious ranching family from Nevada, the Bundys, stepped
in with their own deep-seated call-to-arms against the federal government. The
Bundys' message resonated with other "Sagebrush Rebels" and members of the
Patriot Movement. The result: "one of the most pivotal events in the ongoing
struggle over access and control of U.S. federal public lands."2
The Bundys and other Malheur participants faced criminal charges for the
occupation, but many were acquitted. Jury members appeared swayed by the
anti-government, "take back our lands" sentiment.3 In 2018, President Donald
Trump added fuel to the fire by pardoning the Hammonds for the arson conviction
and then, through the Department of Interior, restoring their grazing privileges.4
The Malheur occupation illustrates the extent to which private users of public
lands and resources will go to assert their perceived rights. It also evidences a
shift in public sentiment exhibited by the election of President Trump and high-
lights the country's divisiveness over "the urban-rural divide, white populism,
and income inequality."' These issues are not limited to the American West, but
1. United States v. Hammond, 742 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1)).
2. PETER WALKER, SAGEBRUSH COLLABORATION: How HARNEY COUNTY DEFEATED THE TAKEOVER
OF THE MALHEUR WILDLIFE REFUGE (2018).
3. Patrik Jonsson, After Bundy Acquittal, Some Surprising Lessons of the Malheur Occupation,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Oct. 29, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2016/1029/After-the-
Bundy-acquittal- some- surprising-les ons-of-the-Malheur-occupation.
4. Reid Wilson, Hammond Pardons Raise Fears of Emboldened Anti-government Extremists, THE
HIL (July 13, 2018 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/396763-hammond-pardons-
raise-fears-of-emboldened-anti-government-extremists; Jennifer Yachnin & Scott Streater, Hammonds'
Grazing Rights Restored, GREENWIRE (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060118899.
5. Ann M. Eisenberg, Do Sagebrush Rebels Have a Colorable Claim? The Space Between
Parochialism and Exclusion in Federal Lands Management, 38 PUB. LAND. & RESOURCES L. REV. 57,
64(2018).
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they are most prevalent in the West, where substantial landholdings are owned by
the federal government, and where some residents and communities feel
disenfranchised.
For well over a century, federal permittees, licensees, and lessees have asserted
an array of formal and informal claims to rangelands, water, minerals, and other
types of public resources. In addition to the claims of ranchers like the
Hammonds and the Bundys, contemporary examples of such claims include con-
tentious oil and gas leases in the Badger-Two Medicine area near Glacier
National Park in Montana and the Sugar Pine Mine in Oregon.6 Private users of
public lands may be further emboldened by the Administration's emphasis on
American energy dominance, unfettered by regulation, and enthusiastic support
for exploitation of fossil fuels and other commodities from the public lands.7
While private opposition to federal regulation has rarely taken the violent turn
that it did at Malheur, these examples are useful for examining the nature of pri-
vate interests in federal public lands and resources. They also help to identify
potential leverage points for defusing the metaphorical (and occasionally literal)
conflagration. The essential question is: What is the proper function of a sover-
eign that is also a proprietor of public resources? Three decades ago, George
Cameron Coggins responded that, "[B]y default, the only possible answer is the
nebulous public interest in the public lands and resources.''8 I concur. The public
interest, which finds its footing in both public lands law and water law, can be
employed as a counterweight to the "take back our land" movement in three
ways: procedurally, as a transparent analytical framework for decision making;
philosophically, as a management ethos; and substantively, as an enforceable
standard. Admittedly, a reinvigorated public interest test is unlikely to change the
hearts and minds of the Sagebrush-Patriots. Its value lies in amplifying the pub-
lic' s voice in the controversy and providing federal decisionmakers with a strong
paradigm by which to manage the public's resources. By refraining the dialogue,
and highlighting the public's interest at the local, regional, and national levels,
civil society discourse might be fostered and conflict-or at least bloodshed-
avoided.
Part I of this Article addresses the historic and cultural context of private inter-
ests in federal public lands and resources, using Malheur, the Badger Two-
Medicine, and the Sugar Pine Mine as examples. Part II illustrates the federal
government's constitutional authority for management of public lands and
resources and for oversight of private claims to them. Part III discusses the federal
statutes and regulations that govern private claims to public rangeland and miner-
als and reveals the deficiencies of such claims. Part IV goes beyond the letter of
6. See infra sections I.B, I.C.
7. See infra note 179-81, 275 and accompanying text.
8. George Cameron Coggins, The Public Interest in Public Land Law: A Commentary on the Policies
of Secretary Watt, 4 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REv. 1, 3 (1983).
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the law to tease out the socio-economic subtext underlying the tenaciousness and
fervor of private claims.
The heart of the Article is found in Part V, which examines the public's interest
in federal public lands and the government's responsibility to protect the public's
interest. Drawing lessons from over a century of both public lands law and water
law, Part V reframes the conversation in a way that weaves the public interest
into the myriad assertions of private rights. It considers the intersection of the
public interest and the Public Trust Doctrine ("PTD"), which is an ancient com-
mon law doctrine that safeguards public access to certain public lands and resour-
ces. The analysis shows that, while the doctrines are distinct, they gain strength,
depth, and breadth from each other. The PTD is valuable tool for informing the
public interest standard and for conceptualizing, implementing, and constraining
management discretion. The public interest standard, as informed by the PTD,
becomes a robust means of managing private rights and conserving public lands
and resources. Finally, the Article concludes with an optimistic, but realistic,
message of convergence, where public interest factors coupled with PTD duties
combine to direct decisionmakers, the public, and the judiciary to demand sus-
tainable uses of federal public lands and resources through the issuance, renewal,
and termination of permits, licenses, and leases.
I. GRASS, GAS, WATER, AND BEYOND
To shed light on recurring assertions of private interests in federal land and
resources, this Part begins with the occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife
Refuge and related disputes over grazing permits and water rights. It then turns to
controversies over mineral leases and hardrock mining claims. These stories illus-
trate the seemingly intractable nature of various types of private claims to public
lands and resources and the libertarian inclination to support them. The laws gov-
erning these claims are covered in Parts II-III of this Article.
A. THE HAMMONDS, THE BUNDYS, AND THEIR PROGENY: FIRE, WATER AND GRASS
For forty-one days in early 2016, the nation's attention was riveted on the
remote snow-covered ground of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in eastern
Oregon, where heavily armed protesters occupied the property and demanded
that the federal government surrender the 188,000-acre Refuge to their control.9
The occupiers, a combined force of Patriot Movement followers and Sagebrush
Rebels ("Sagebrush-Patriots" for purposes of this article), described the occupa-
tion as "a stand against federal tyranny and government mismanagement of
9. Kirk Johnson, Julie Turkwitz & Richard Perez-Pefia, Verdict in Oregon Draws Surprise and
Questions About Equity, N.Y. TuMEs (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/lO/29/us/oregon-
bundy-verdict-wildlife-refuge.html.
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natural resources."' They claimed to be acting in support of local ranchers,
Dwight and Steven Hammond, whom they believed had been unfairly convicted
for setting fire to federal public lands.1
In 2012, the Hammonds were charged with maliciously destroying the real
property of the United States.12 At trial, they claimed they had started fires on
their own land to bum off invasive species. They were contradicted by witnesses
who testified that Steven had illegally slaughtered deer on BLM property and had
lit the fire to destroy the evidence.13 The Hammonds lit another fire while a
county-wide bum ban was in effect, putting local and federal firefighters at risk.14
Adding rhetorical fuel to the flames, witnesses stated that Steven intended to
"light up the whole country on fire."15 For his part, Dwight had threatened federal
"gestapo" (BLM and U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service ("FWS") managers) many
times prior to the incident.16 The two were convicted and sentenced to five years
in prison, the mandatory minimum sentence under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act.17 The Hammonds' five-year sentence raised the
hackles of the Patriot Movement, and precipitated the occupation of Malheur.18
Returning to 2016, the Malheur stand-off took a deadly turn when occupation
leader LaVoy Finicum was shot and killed at a police roadblock.1 9 Finicum and
others were en route from Malheur to a community meeting on the constitution
with Grant County Sheriff Glenn Palmer, a "hardline critic of the federal govem-
ment," when state and federal officers pulled them over.20 The others surrendered,
10. Tay Wiles, Acquitted, Convicted, Fined or Free: After the Oregon Standoff, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.hcn.org/articles/malheur-national-wildlife-refuge-acquitted-
convicted- fined- or-free-malheur- sentences.
11. Id.
12. United States v. Hammond, 742 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2014).
13. U.S. Attorney's Office: Dist. of Or., Eastern Oregon Ranchers Convicted of Arson Resentenced
to Five Years in Prison (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-or/pr/eastern-oregon-ranchers-
convicted-arson-resentenced-five-years -prison. One eyewitness barely escaped the ten-foot high flames,
which ultimately consumed 139 acres of public land and, incidentally, destroyed all evidence of game
violations. Id.
14. Id.; Bill Gabbert, President Trump Pardons Oregon Ranchers, WILDFIRE TODAY (July 10, 2018),
https://wildfiretoday.com/2018/07/10/president-trump-pardons-oregon-ranchers-convicted-of-arson/.
15. 742 F.3d at 882.
16. Leah Sottile, Cattle Rancher, Subject of Possible White House Pardon, Had Years of Disputes
with Malheur Wildlife Refuge, WASH. POST (June 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
2018/06/14/cattle-rancher- subject-of-possible-white-house-pardon-had-years -of-disputes -with-malheur-
wildlife-refuge/?noredirect=on&utm term=.457f3316eb0a. In letters to refuge managers, Hammond
called employees "gestapo" and said that if he did not get unfettered access, "the problem will be greatly
amplified." Id. (emphasis provided). In another, Dwight said he'd "pack a shotgun in his saddle" and told
the refuge manager, in person, to bring a witness to watch him "tear your head off." Id.
17. 742 F.3d at 882 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1)).
18. Wiles, supra note 10.
19. Johnson, Turkwitz & Perez-Pefia, supra note 9.
20. Les Zaitz, Sheriff s Stance in LaVoy Finicum Shooting Draws Outrage, THE OREGONIAN (Feb.
23, 2016), https://www.oregonlive.com/oregon-standoff/2016/02/oregon standoff-sheriffs-stanc.html.
The provision to be discussed is the Enclave Clause, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 17, which Palmer and the Malheur
occupants say restricts the amount of land owned by the federal government. See infra section II.B.
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but Finicum kept driving. A mile down the road, he hit a snow bank beside the
roadblock, jumped out of his truck, and reached for a pocket containing a 9mm
handgun, shouting, "go ahead and shoot me."21 An Oregon state police officer
obliged, pulling the trigger that delivered the fatal bullet." The circumstances of
Finicum's death further agitated the Sagebrush-Patriot's anti-government
sentiment.
Eleven of the protestors pleaded guilty, but ring-leader Amman Bundy and
others, who were tried for weapons charges and conspiracy to prevent BLM and
FWS employees from doing their jobs, took their cases to trial.24 It came as a sur-
prise to many when Bundy and six of his co-defendants were acquitted. Jurors
were apparently sympathetic to what defense attorneys described as a "Martin
Luther King style sit-in" at the Refuge.26 One juror told the press that he prosecu-
tors overreached by attempting to prove that the defendants conspired with the
specific criminal intent to obstruct federal employees.27 After refining their strat-
egy, prosecutors won convictions of four occupiers.28
As for the Hammonds, President Trump subsequently pardoned the father-son
duo, releasing Dwight and Steven from prison where they had been held since
their conviction on the initial arson charges.29 The White House criticized the
Obama Administration's "overzealous" prosecution as patently "unjust.' '3
According to the Executive Clemency statement, "[t]he Hammonds are devoted
21. Leah Sottile, FBI Agent Acquitted of Lying About Shooting at Militia Member During Malheur
Standoff, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/
08/10 /fbi- agent- acquitted- of-lying-about- shooting- of-militia-member-after-malheur- standoff/?utm-
term=.adcb8fd5348e.
22. Id.
23. Maxine Bernstein, Jury Acquits FBI Agent Accused of Lying in Finicum Shooting Case,
OREGONLIVE (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.oregonlive.com/oregon-standoff/2018/08/juryreturns_
verdict in case o.html (quoting Brian Levin of the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism).
24. Courtney Sherwood & Kirk Johnson, Bundy Brothers Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/us/bundy-brothers-acquitted-in-takeover-of-oregon-wildlife-
refuge.html.
25. Leah Sottile, Jury Acquits Ammon Bundy, Six Others for Standoff at Oregon Wildlife Refuge,
WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/10/27/jury-
acquits -leaders -of- armed-takeover-of-the-oregon-wildlife-refuge-of-federal-conspiracy-charges/?utm-
term=.2502445fld0c.
26. Id.
27. Maxine Bernstein, Conspiracy Charge, Defendants' State of Mind Proved Hurdles in Ammon
Bundy Prosecution, OREGONLIVE (Oct. 30, 2016), https://www.oregonlive.cco/oregon-standoff/2016/
10/conspircon charge-defendants s.html.
28. Kirk Johnson, Charges Against Bundys in Ranch Standoff Case Are Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/08/us/bundy-ranch-standoff-case-charges-dismissed.html.
Ryan Payne, an "architect of the occupation" and, according to the Assistant U.S. Attorney, "the most
culpable defendant in this case," received the stiffest sentence of 37 months in prison. Conrad Wilson,
Occupation Leader Ryan Payne Sentenced, OPB (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.opb.org/news/series/
burns -oregon- standoff-bundy-militia-news -updates/ryan-payne-sentence/.
29. Wilson, supra note 4.
30. John Wagner, Trump Pardons Oregon Ranchers in Case that Sparked 41-Day Occupation,
WASH. POST (July 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trmp-pardons-oregon-cattle-
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family men, respected contributors to their local community, and have wide-
spread support from their neighbors, local law enforcement, and farmers and
ranchers across the West."3 1 Subsequently, the BLM restored the Hammonds'
grazing privileges, despite years of flagrant permit violations.3"
Some terrorism experts fear that the Hammonds' pardon will further embolden
militant groups.33 Moreover, restoring the Hammonds' grazing privileges may
undermine public confidence in the rule of law by rewarding lawlessness.34 It
seems likely that the Trump Administration's support of the Hammonds will
deepen the polarization over our public lands.35
The public lands have been the subject of robust debate at various points in our
nation's history.36 The Malheur occupation represents just one incident (albeit a
notable one) in a series of ongoing disputes over federal land ownership and man-
agement going back to the Sagebrush Rebellion of the 1970s and 1980s, and the
County Supremacy Movement of the 1990s.37 In addition to prioritizing private
economic uses over conservation and public recreation, proponents of these
ranchers-in-case-that-sparked-41 -day-occupation-of-national- wildlife-refuge/2018/07/10/8f7aefaO- 844c-
I1 e8 -8553-a3ce89036c78_story.html?noredirect=on&utm term=.e49dlObdeb66.
31. Id.
32. Yachnin & Streater, supra note 4.
33. See Carl Segerstrom, Trump Pardons Oregon Ranchers, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (July 10, 2018),
https://www.hcn.org/articles/sagebrush-rebellion-donald-trump-pardons-oregon-ranchers- whose-arrest-
sparked-Malheur-standoff (describing how the pardon may be seen as "the latest win for sagebrush
rebels [and] anti-government extremists"); Wagner, supra note 26 ("the fact that Trump pardoned them
outright rather than commuting their sentences 'sends a message of tolerance for lawbreakers who could
diminish our public lands and waters') (quoting Land Tawney, president of Backcountry Hunters &
Anglers). See also Peniel Joseph, The Hypocrisy at the Heart of Trump's Rancher Pardon, CNN (July
11, 2018, 5:40 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/10/opinions/trump-hammond-pardon-race-and-
justice-joseph-opinion/index.html (describing how the pardon "showcases the double standard of justice
... [where] White survivalists ... are treated as misguided patriots, overzealous citizens whose love of
country .., caused them to misbehave").
34. Yachnin & Streater, supra note 4. See Arran Robinson, Injustice: The Pardon of the Hammonds,
OREGON WILD (July 10, 2018), https://www.oregonwild.org/aboutblog/injustice-pardon-hammonds
(observing that the Hammond case could have provided the impetus to reform unjust "mandatory
minimum statutes ... that could apply equally to the many other individuals, predominantly minorities,
serving unjust sentences").
35. See Rocky Barker, With Pardon, Trump Perpetuates Bundy Standoff, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
(July 17, 2018), https://www.hcn.org/articles/opinion-with-a-pardon-trump-perpetuates -bundy- standoff
("provocateurs feel empowered to push their alternative brand of American history and the law");
WALKER, supra note 2, at viii (detailing an assessment of the reaction in Harney County, and the
community's grassroots efforts to seek collaborative solutions to anti-government forces).
36. See supra Part IV.
37. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 58. See Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and Environmental Law: An
Intergovern-mental Perspective on the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847, 848 (1982) (providing
background on the bid to turn federal lands over to the states); John D. Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush
Rebellion: Law, Politics and Federal Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317, 319 (1980) (assessing the
Rebellion).
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movements insist that federal ownership of public lands is illegal and seek dives-
titure of them to the states.38
The modem day permutation of the divestiture movement is championed by a
number of western counties and the state of Utah,39 as well as the Bundys and
individuals like Wayne Hage, who doggedly refused to obtain a permit to graze
his cattle on public land in Nevada.4" When faced with trespass charges, Hage
argued that his state-recognized water rights entitled him to an easement o move
livestock across the public rangelands free of government regulation and fees. It
took decades to resolve the dispute, but the Ninth Circuit ultimately rejected his
argument.4 1
Like Hage, the Bundys have been at the center of some of the most vehement
disputes over public lands and resources. In 2014, a twenty-year battle over graz-
ing fees on federal allotments near Bunkerville, Nevada, came to a head when a
federal court enjoined Cliven Bundy's unlawful grazing and authorized the re-
moval of 400 of his cattle.42 Hundreds of Bundy's supporters-joined by well-
armed Sagebrush-Patriot paramilitaries-gathered to prevent the removal. Cliven
proclaimed that he was "ready to do battle" to protect "his property" and to keep
the cattle on the range.43 To prevent bloodshed, law enforcement agents
withdrew.
44
Federal prosecutors in Nevada subsequently obtained a sixteen-count indict-
ment against Cliven, his son Ammon (who was one of the leaders at Malheur),
and a dozen other defendants for unlawful use of firearms, obstruction of justice,
38. Michael C. Blumm & Olivier Jamin, The Property Clause and Its Discontents: Lessons from the
Malheur Occupation, 43 Eco. L. Q. 781, 785 (2017).
39. For details, see Robert B. Keiter & John Ruple, The Transfer of Public Lands Movement: Taking
the 'Public' Out of Public Lands, S.J. QUINNEY C. L. RES. PAPER No. 99 1, 1 (2015), http://papers.ssm.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2555922 (assessing Utah's Transfer of Public Lands Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 63L-6- 101 (West, 2012)); Michael C. Blumm & Kara Tebeau, Antimonopoly in American Public
Land Law, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 155, 216 (2016); JOHN D. LESHY, DEBUNKING CREATION MYTHS
ABOUT AMERICA'S PUBLIC LANDS (2018).
40. Christine Dorsey, Property Rights Fight: Nye County Rancher Gains Partial Victory, LAS VEGAS
REv.-J., Feb. 12, 2002, at 4B.
41. United States v. Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d 712, 719 (9th Cir. 2016); Sean Whaley, Court Rules
Hage Family Must Pay $587K for Grazing Cattle, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.
reviewjournal.com/local/local-nevada/court-rumles-hage-family-must-pay- 587k-for-grazing-cattle-on-
federal- land- in-nevada/. See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (detailing the Hage case).
42. United States v. Bundy, No. 2:12-cv-0804-LDG-GWF, 2013 WL 3463610, at *3 (D. Nev. July 9,
2013).The court enjoined present and future trespasses and authorized the removal of Bundy's cattle
from BLM and National Park Service lands within the Lake Mead National Recreation Area. Id. at *1.
43. United States v. Bundy, No. 2:16-cr-00046-PAL-GMN, 2016 WL 7190546 at *2 (D. Nev. Dec.
12, 2016). See Adam Nagourney, A Defiant Rancher Savors the Audience That Rallied to His Side, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2014, at Al (describing public support for Bundy).
44. See Spencer Sunshine, Standoffs and the Far Right: What Changed After Oklahoma City,
POLITICAL RES. ASSOCIATES (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.politicalresearch.org/2018/04/19/standoffs-
and-the-far-right-what-changed-after-oklahoma-city/ (describing the Bundy incident as "the first time
the Patriot movement strategy of armed confrontation with the federal government worked").
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assault of federal officers, extortion, and conspiracy.45 Court watchers predicted
that the Nevada prosecutors faced anuphill battle "persuading the jury to trust the
government's side of the story in the face of a wave of anti-institutionalism that
has influenced everything from the presidential election on down.''46 In the end,
a federal judge declared a mistrial and dismissed the chargesagainst Bundy and
his sons.47 According to the judge, prosecutors engaged in "flagrant misconduct"
by failing to turn over important evidence to the defense.48 While prosecutors
seek a new trial,4 9 the injunction against grazing remains in place, despite the
Bundys' attempts to have it lifted.0
Heated rhetoric, sensationalistic media coverage, and semi-automatic weapons
have become a hallmark of this new strain of Sagebrush-Patriot conflicts.5 1 The
Malheur occupation was supported by an affiliation of militia-type groups,
including the Patriot Movement and the Oregon Constitutional Guard, that fight a
perceived "systematic abuse of land rights, gun rights, freedom of speech and
other liberties" by the federal government.5 2 Cliven Bundy's lawyer compared
Bundy "with the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and the stand at Bunkerville
with the 1965 march on Selma."3 Trespassers on federal public lands ay they
are "Going Bundy."54 The Bundy family has become a potent symbol in anti-
government circles, with "a small army of livestreamers, radio hosts and local
politicians champion[ing] their cause."5 5 According to the BLM, over two dozen
45. See In re Bundy, 840 F.3d 1034, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2016)(addressing procedural issues related to
indictments of Bundy and 18 others); Marshall Swearingen, Arms Race on the Range, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, Feb. 2, 2016, at 22 (describing BLM's increased law enforcement emphasis).
46. Julie Turkewitz, Federal Trial Begins for Rancher Cliven Bundy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/us/federal-trial-begins-for-the-nevada-rancher-cliven-
bundy.html.
47. Johnson, supra note 28. Several of the lesser known Bunkerville participants were found guilty of
assault and related charges. Sarah Childress, Bundy Supporter Sentenced to 68 Years in Bunkerville
Case, PBS FRONTLINE (July 17, 2017).
48. Barker, supra note 35; Johnson, supra note 28. According to prosecutors, "fears of violence
against witnesses" drove their choice of evidence to release. Id.
49. Jennifer Yachnin, Prosecutors Call for New Cliven Bundy Trial, GREENWIRE (Feb. 7, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060119935.
50. See United States v. Bundy, No. 2:98-CV-00531-LRH-VCF, 2018 WL 3390182, at *1 (D. Nev.
July 12, 2018) (rejecting Bundy's motion to vacate the injunction as "untimely and meritless").
51. See Jonathan Thompson, A New and More Dangerous Sagebrush Rebellion, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
(Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.hcn.org/articles/a-new-and-more-dangerous-sagebrush-rebellion (explaining
how Malheur reveals "a bigger and more sinister problem than your run-of-the-mill local-control scuffle");
John W. Ragsdale, Jr., The American Legacy of Public Land Rebellion, 48 URB. L. 599, 599 (2016) ("The
most recent manifestation of the Sagebrush Rebellion is a mind-bending, consciousness altering, looking
glass version of logic and reality... [with] swat teams of heavily armed, confrontation- seeking acolytes,
equipped with flak jackets, AK-47s, second amendment signage, and 'patriot' bling.").
52. Kevin Sullivan, Primed to Fight the Government, WASH. POST (May 21, 2016).
53. Turkewitz, supra note 46. The Bunkerville insurrection was supported by the militia group
Operation Mutual Aid. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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incidents of so-called "sovereign citizen" activity took place on public lands in
seven western states between 2012 and 2015.56
In the aftermath of the Malheur occupation and the Bundy standoff, the United
States still owns the land in question and still manages grazing. Yet "the discon-
tents' claims" have tremendous tenacity and a remarkable degree of political and
public support. 5' The unprecedented government shutdown of 2018-2019 may
further erode public confidence in the rule of law, going well beyond federal pub-
lic lands management.5 8
B. THE BADGER-TWO MEDICINE: SACRED SITES, OIL AND GAS
Around the same time as Ammon Bundy's acquittal in the Malheur trial in
2016 in Oregon, the Secretary of the Interior cancelled a mineral lease held by
Solenex in the Badger-Two Medicine area of the Lewis and Clark National
Forest in Montana.9 Solenex and its predecessor had held onto the lease since
1982 without producing any oil or gas from the leasehold.6' The Secretary sus-
pended the lease in 1993 and then cancelled it in 2016 on the grounds that the
lease was invalid at its inception due to noncompliance with environmental
laws.61 Specifically, the Secretary cited to the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA")62 and the National Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA").
63
The Badger-Two Medicine area encompasses approximately 130,000 acres of
land within the Lewis and Clark National Forest, adjacent to Glacier National
Park, the Scapegoat and Bob Marshall Wilderness Areas, and the Blackfeet
Indian Reservation.64 The area was part of the Blackfeet reservation until 1896,
when the Tribe ceded it to the United States but retained hunting, fishing, and
gathering rights.65 The area remains "one of the most cultural and religiously
56. Sunshine, supra note 44. See Jonathon Thompson, These Ain't Your Daddy's Sagebrush Rebels,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 8, 2016, at 17 (describing how politicians, militants, and sheriffs "from
across the right-wing spectrum have found common cause . . . bound together by libertarian-tinged
ideology, disdain for Obama and fear that the government will take away their guns, their liberty, their
money, their land, their Confederate flags, and, yes, Christmas").
57. Blumm & Jamin, supra note 38, at 825.
58. See generally Suzanne Nossel, Trump and May Are Discrediting Democracy, FOREIGN POLICY
(Jan. 24, 2019); Chauncey DeVega, Timothy Snyder on the Shutdown Showdown, SALON.COM (Jan. 13,
2019).
59. Federal Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 12, Solenex v. Jewell, 334 F.
Supp.3d 174 (2018) No. 13-993-RJL.
60. Id. at 8-10. For the "long, detailed, and torturous" history, see Solenex v. Jewell, 156 F.Supp.3d
83, 84 (D.D.C. 2015).
61. Solenex v. Jewell, 334 F.Supp.3d 174, 180 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal pending sub nom, Solenex v.
Bernhardt, No.18-5343 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 28, 2018).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 91-190).
63. 54 U.S.C. § 300101 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 113-287).
64. Federal Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 59, at 6.
65. Act of June 10, 1896, ch. 398, § 9, art. I, 29 Stat. 321; see Martin Nie, The Use of Co-
Management and Protected Land-Use Designations to Protect Tribal Cultural Resources and Reserved
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significant areas to the Blackfeet People since time immemorial."66 A substantial
portion of the Badger-Two Medicine area is designated a traditional cultural dis-
trict ("TCD") under the National Register of Historic Places due to its archaeo-
logical features, its importance to the Tribe's treaty rights and traditional
practices, and its association with "culturally important spirits, heroes, and his-
toric figures."6 The Solenex leasehold is within the TCD boundaries.68
In 1997, while the Solenex lease was in suspension, the BLM and the Forest
Service issued a decision that "declined to authorize" any new oil and gas leasing
in the Badger-Two Medicine to preserve traditional cultural sites and uses, endan-
gered species, scenic values, and roadless character.6 9 Subsequently, in 2001,
based on the Forest Service's recommendation, the Secretary of the Interior with-
drew 405,000 acres of land on the Rocky Mountain Front Range, including the
Badger-Two Medicine, from location and entry under the 1872 Mining Law.v°
In 2006, Congress permanently withdrew the entire area from both oil and gas
leasing and from location and entry under the mining law, subject to valid exist-
ing rights v.7 Nearly two thirds of the original leaseholders took advantage of tax
incentives established by Congress in exchange for the voluntary relinquishment
of their leases.7 2 Solenex and a few others did not.3
According to then-Secretary Sally Jewell, Congress's 2006 withdrawal
stripped her of discretion to correct the NEPA and NHPA deficiencies in the old
Solenex lease.7 4 Moreover, even if she had discretion, the Secretary said she
would not exercise it because development would irreparably harm natural and
cultural resources v' According to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation:
If implemented, the Solenex exploratory well along with the reasonably fore-
seeable full field development would be so damaging to the TCD that the
Blackfeet Tribe's ability to practice their religious and cultural traditions in
this area as a part of their community life and development would be lost. The
Treaty Rights on Federal Lands, 48 Nat. Res. J. 585, 589 (2008) (describing the treaty and the area's
continuing significance to the Blackfeet).
66. Blackfeet Resolution No. 260-2014 (2014), at http://www.badger-twomedicine.org/pdf/
BlackfeetTribeResolution.pdf. The Badger-Two Medicine is central to the tribe's creation story, and
members continue to hunt, fish, and engage in ceremonies and vision quests in the area.
67. Comments of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Regarding the Release from
Suspension of the Permit to Drill by Solenex LLC in Lewis and Clark National Forest 4 (Sept. 21, 2015),
available at https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/ACHP%20Rec.%20Letter%20re%20-%
20B2M%20Lease.pdf.
68. Federal Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 59, at 8.
69. Id. at 7.
70. Id. (citing Public Land Order No. 7480, 66 Fed. Reg. 6657 (2001)).
71. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922, § 403.
72. Steven Mufson & Brady Davis, Obama Administration Cancels Oil and Gas Leases on Blackfeet
Tribe's Sacred Grounds, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2016.
73. Id.
74. Federal Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 59, at 18.
75. Id.
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cumulative effects of full field development, even with the mitigation meas-
ures proposed by Solenex, would result in serious and irreparable degradation
of the historic values of the TCD that sustain the Tribe.76
Meanwhile, industry advocates anticipated that the Solenex decision would set
a precedent against other developers.7 7 Their concerns came to fruition in
November 2016, when the BLM canceled fifteen additional oil and gas leases in
the Badger-Two Medicine area, leaving only two remaining leases in the area.78
The BLM agreed to refund rents and bonus bids to Devon Energy, which held an
interest in those two leases.7 9 The other lessee, Moncrief, subsequently sued the
United States,80 characterizing the cancellation as "[s]triking for its brazenness
and unbridled hostility toward a lessee possessing real property rights."81
The district court granted summary judgment to both Solenex and Moncrief,
8 2
and expressed unadulterated outrage at the infringement of their rights.83 Appeals
are pending before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.84 The merits are discussed
below.8
C. OPERATION GOLD RUSH
President Trump's decision to shrink Bears Ears and Grand Staircase
Escalante National Monuments and open the surrounding public lands to mining
has stimulated interest in cobalt, copper, uranium, and other hardrock deposits
located outside the newly redrawn monument boundaries. The first major threat
to conservation interests came when Glacier Lake Resources, a Canadian mining
76. Comments of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, supra note 67, at 7. See also
Kathryn Sears Ore, Form and Substance: The National Historic Preservation Act, Badger-Two
Medicine, and Meaningful Consultation, 38 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REv. 205, 209 (2017) (discussing
NHPA consultation).
77. Ellen Gilmer, Drillers Call 'NEPA Shenanigans' on Interior as it Scraps Leases, E&E NEWS:
ENERGYWIRE, Feb. 16, 2016.
78. BLM Press Release, Secretary Jewell, Senator Tester, Blackfeet Nation and Devon Energy
Announce Cancellation of Oil & Gas Leases in Montana's Lewis and Clark National Forest, Nov. 16,
2016, available at https://www.blm.gov/press-release/secretary-jewell-senator-tester-blackfeet-nation-
and-devon-energy-announce.
79. Mufson & Davis, supra note 72.
80. Complaint, Moncriefv. U.S. Dept. of Interior, No. 1:17-cv-00609-RJL, 2017 WL 1276819 (D.D.C.
April 5, 2017). Moncrief's lease was cancelled on Mar. 17, 2016. Id.
81. Motion for Summary Judgment, W.A. Moncrief v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, No. 1:17-cv-00609-
RJL, 12 (D.D.C. Aug. 24,2017).
82. See Solenex v. Jewell, 334 F.Supp.3d 174, 183-84 (D.D.C. 2018) (stating that lease cancellation
"wreaks havoc on the interests of individual leaseholders" and dismissing the government's argument as
"horsefeathers"), appealpending sub nom, Solenex v. Bernhardt, No.18-5343 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 28, 2018);
Moncrief v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 339 F. Supp.3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal pending, 18-5341 (Nov.
28, 2018).
83. See Solenex, 334 F.Supp.3d at 183-84 (stating that lease cancellation "wreaks havoc on the
interests of individual leaseholders" and dismissing the government's argument as "horsefeathers").
84. See supra note 82.
85. See infra section III.B.2.
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firm, announced the acquisition of the Colt Mesa deposit in an area formerly
within Grand Staircase.6
Hardrock mining claims on federal public lands run the gamut from gargantuan
operations conducted by international conglomerates to modest grubstakes by
mom-and-pop operators and weekend rockhounds. While a great deal of media
attention is focused on the former, and operations like Colt Mesa, this subpart
focuses on the latter-the small-scale operators who tend to pick fights with fed-
eral land managers flying the flag of Sagebrush Rebels, Patriots, and similar head-
ings. The Sugar Pine Mine is one such claim.
In 2015, on public lands in southern Oregon, BLM archaeologists discovered a
large manmade clearing, poured concrete, milling equipment, several trailers, a
bulldozer, and a buried water pipe system.87 Because the mining had not received
prior approval, it violated BLM's regulations.88 Shortly thereafter, a BLM law
enforcement officer and a sheriff's deputy hand-delivered a letter to the Sugar
Pine Mine's owners, Rick Barclay and George Backes, and offered them three
options: either cease mining; file a plan of operations to account for the surface
disturbance; or file an appeal with the Interior Board of Land Appeals.9 In
response, Barclay and Backes enlisted the Oath Keepers to help defend their
property rights, and Operation Gold Rush was launched.90
Barclay and Backes are following a long and checkered tradition of hardrock
miners asserting grandiose claims to seize and occupy public lands. None have
been quite as crafty as Ralph Cameron, who staked the Cape Horn claim in 1902
on the south rim of the Grand Canyon, shortly before Teddy Roosevelt designated
the Grand Canyon a National Monument.9 Cameron demanded fees from the
public "for access to public land that he did not own and for which he lacked any
lawful claim"-namely, the Bright Angel Trail.92 His case made it all the way to
the United States Supreme Court before he was ultimately ousted from the land.93
86. Chris D'Angelo, A Canadian Firm Prepares to Mine Land Trump Cut From Monument
Protection, HUFFINGTON POST, June 21, 2018.
87. Tay Wiles, Sugar Pine Mine, The Other Standoff, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 2, 2016.
88. See 43 C.F.R. § 3715.0-5 (requiring applications for occupancy of public lands, including "full or
part-time residence on the public lands," as well as activities that involve the construction or
maintenance of temporary or permanent structures that may be used for occupancy).
89. Wiles, Sugar Pine Mine, supra note 87.
90. Id.
91. Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 456 (1920).
92. Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 37 GA. L. REv. 473, 491
(2003) (citing JOHN D. LESHY, THE MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION 57 (1987)). The
Department of Interior found that Cameron's claim lacked sufficient mineral values to support it. Id.
93. Cameron, 252 U.S. at 459-60. The Court invoked the public interest in reaching its decision:
"[T]he Secretary ... is charged with seeing that ... valid claims may be recognized, invalid ones
eliminated, and the rights of the public preserved," and that "[a]ll must conform to the law under which
they are initiated; otherwise they work an unlawful private appropriation in derogation of the rights of
the public." Id. at 460.
2019]
THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIEW
Journalists described the region where the Sugar Pine Mine is located as "an
economically depressed, independent-spirited rural county that was ripe for an in-
surgency."94 According to federal prosecutors, the Bundys and other sympa-
thizers of Barclay and Backes presented a show of force with armed patrols
designed to prevent federal officials from entering the Sugar Pine claim.9 The
miners believe they have a right to develop the unpatented claims without con-
straints under the 1872 Mining Law.96 Conversely, the BLM says that, at the very
least, the amount of surface disturbance requires the miners to file a notice or plan
of operations.97
In the end, there was no dramatic standoff Instead, Barclay and Backes
appealed the BLM's finding of non-compliance.98 They were allowed to stay on
the claims until the Interior Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA") could render a
decision.99
II. CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OVER PRIVATE INTERESTS ON PUBLIC LANDS
Sagebrush-Patriots are known to wield pocket-sized versions of the U.S.
Constitution to dispute federal authority over the federal public lands and resour-
ces. This Part demonstrates how the relevant provisions actually undermine their
claims. It lays the groundwork for the federal statutes and regulations governing
grazing, mineral leasing, and mining, which are covered in the next Part.
A. THE PROPERTY CLAUSE
Article IV of the Constitution vests Congress with "the Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States."100 Although the "full scope of this para-
graph has never been definitely settled,"' ' the United States Supreme Court held
94. Id.
95. United States v. Bundy, No. 216CR00046GMNPAL, 2017 WL 2938197, at *1 (D. Nev. July 9,
2017). In the criminal case against the Bundy's and others for the 2014 confrontation in Bunkerville, the
U.S. introduced evidence of the Bundy's involvement at Sugar Pine Mine to support its allegations of
conspiracy. The court held that the evidence was admissible, as the conspiracy was ongoing and
included the Sugar Pine incident; further, Sugar Pine was "inextricably intertwined" with the
Bunkerville offenses "because Defendants were using the glorification of their success in Bunkerville to
recruit others to these subsequent but similar causes ... includ[ing] showing force against federal agents
to prevent those agents from accomplishing their lawful actions." Id. at 3.
96. 30 U.S.C. §§ 611-614 (Westlaw throughPub. L. 115-281).
97. George E. Backes & Rick Barclay, 193 IBLA 209 (Oct. 29, 2018); 43 C.F.R. § 3809.
98. Notice of Appeal, United States. v. George Backes and Rick Barclay, Interior Board of Land
Appeals, OR68322 (Apr. 22, 2015).
99. Petitions for Stay Granted, IBLA 2015-142 & 2015-143 (May 19, 2015), available at https://
www.eenews.net/assets/2015/05/21/document-gw_05.pdf. See infra notes 255-260 (discussing the
merits).
100. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
101. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89 (1907).
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that "[p]rimarily, at least, it is a grant of power to the United States of control
over its property.
' 10 2
United States v. Grimaud was one of the first tests of the Property Clause
power to protect federal public lands.10 3 The Forest Reserve Act of 1897 author-
ized the Secretary of Agriculture to "make provisions for the protection against
destruction by fire and depredations upon the public forests and forest reserva-
tions ... and ... such rules and regulations ... as will insure the objects of such
reservations; namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve the for-
ests thereon from destruction."' 4 With this authority, the Secretary issued rules
requiring ranchers to secure permits to graze livestock in a forest reserve. The
defendants, who were charged with grazing sheep without a permit, argued that
the Act was unconstitutional because it delegated too much power to the
Secretary. The Supreme Court was unsympathetic. It held that Congress had
properly wielded the Property Clause to give the Secretary power to "fill up the
details" of regulating "occupancy and use ... to preserve the forests from
destruction.'1 '
The same day as its decision in Grimaud, the Court issued an opinion in Light
v. United States,16 a case involving a Colorado rancher who allowed his cattle to
roam upon national forest land. The rancher argued that the government lacked
the power to prevent his cattle from using adjacent forest land, and cited a
Colorado law which required landowners to fence their land in order to prevent
trespass by livestock.1 0 7 The Court found that state law is "not operative on the
public domain,"'l ' and that no vested rights could arise from any previously
implied consent to roam on unfenced federal lands.10 9 The Court added: "The
United States can prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its property may
be used. As it can withhold or reserve the land it can do so indefinitely." 0
A few years later, in Utah Power and Light v. United States, a utility company
asserted a right to maintain unpermitted electric facilities on national forest land
pursuant to state law.1 The Court disagreed in a unanimous opinion, which held
that "the power of Congress is exclusive and that only through its exercise in
some form can rights in lands belonging to the United States be acquired."
' 1 2
102. Id. See United States v. Gratiot 39 U.S. 526, 537-538 (1840) (holding that Congress had
Property Clause authority to dispose of mineral leases as it saw fit).
103. 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
104. 30 Stat. at L. 35, chap. 2, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1540.
105. Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 517.
106. 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
107. Id. at 529.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 535.
110. Id. at 536.
111. 243 U.S. 389 (1917).
112. Id. at 404.
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Similarly, in United States v. City of San Francisco, the Court recognized the
federal government's plenary power to impose conditions on the disposal of pub-
lic lands for the "benefit of the people."'113 Subsequent cases have held that
"Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the
public domain,"'114 and it acts within constitutional bounds when it delegates its
"general managerial powers" over public lands to the Secretary of Interior.1 '
The Property Clause's power to protect the public lands and to impose condi-
tions on the land's use or disposal may also be wielded to protect natural resour-
ces that are intimately associated with the public lands, such as wildlife. In Hunt
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the Property Clause included the
power to thin overpopulated herds of deer in order to protect forest resources,
even if the federal action was contrary to state law.116 The Court broadly con-
strued Hunt in Kleppe v. New Mexico, where the Court stated that, although Hunt
found that "damage to federal land is a sufficient basis for regulation..., it con-
tains no suggestion that it is a necessary one." '117 Kleppe involved the Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Act,118 which prohibited the capture and destruction
of unclaimed horses and burros on public lands. The Court determined that the
Property Clause's power "necessarily" includes protection of wildlife "integral"
to the public lands.119 Thus, the Court upheld BLM's jurisdiction over burros as a
"needful" regulation "respecting" public lands.12 °
Not only does the Property Clause supply authority to regulate activities that
occur on the public lands, it also authorizes federal regulation of activities outside
of the federal boundaries where necessary to protect the public lands and resour-
ces.121 For example, in Camfield v. United States, the owner of several sections of
private land fenced his land and consequently enclosed about 20,000 acres of
public lands.122 The Supreme Court determined that the federal government "has
a power over its own property analogous to the police power of the several States
113. 310 U.S. 16, 23, 30 (1940). The Court upheld a conditional transfer of land that forbade the
monopolization of hydropower produced on federal lands. See John D. Leshy, A Property Clause for the
Twenty-First Century, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1101, 1110 (2004) (explaining why "the Court demands that
Congress express itself more clearly when it wants to dispose of federal lands than when it retains
them").
114. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
115. Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472,476 (1963); Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334,
336 (1963).
116. Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
117. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 536.
118. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 115-281).
119. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 536.
120. Id.
121. See Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress "Without Limitation": The Property Clause and
Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1, 77 (2001) (observing that he courts have
"uniformly" upheld federal power "to control extraterritorial private activities that might adversely
affect federal property").
122. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
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... and the extent to which it may go in the exercise of such power is measured
by the exigencies of the particular case.' 123 Therefore, the Court upheld the appli-
cation of the Unlawful Enclosures Act to remove the fence from Camfield's
property.
Circling back to livestock grazing, in Hage v. United States, the Ninth Circuit
grappled with a claim concerning grazing-related water rights on federal range-
land. Rancher Wayne Hage, like the Bundys, gained a good deal of notoriety for
his brazen trespasses on public lands in Nevada.124 The Ninth Circuit, citing the
Property Clause, rejected Hage's argument that state-recognized water rights
entitled him to any easements or appurtenances to graze livestock on federal
lands.1 21 While "the ownership of water rights provides a substantial benefit to an
applicant," because owners of water rights get a preference in grazing permits,
126
"the ownership of water rights has no effect on the requirement that a rancher
obtain a grazing permit ... before allowing cattle to graze on federal lands.127
The moral of the story: bootstrapping one interest that constitutes property under
state law to an interest in another related federal resource is unlikely to get the
claimant very far as a matter of constitutional law.
B. THE ENCLAVE CLAUSE
Federal enclaves are distinct from federal public lands. The Sagebrush-Patriots
assert that the Enclave Clause limits federal power over the public lands, but it
does not in fact do so.
1 28
Under the Enclave Clause, "Congress may acquire derivative legislative power
from a State ... by consensual acquisition of land, or by nonconsensual acquisi-
tion followed by the state's cession of authority over the land. ' 129 In addition to
granting Congress exclusive authority over Washington, D.C., the Enclave
Clause provides authority to purchase state land for various federal purposes.
Specifically, Congress has power "[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever," over "the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exer-
cise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of
the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals,
dock-yards, and other needful buildings. '1 30 "Needful buildings" include most
123. Id. at 525-26 (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-1063).
124. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
125. United States v. Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d 712, 718 (9th Cir. 2016).
126. See id. at 717 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 315b ("Preference shall be given in the issuance of grazing
permits to... owners of water or water rights")). However, the denial of all access to vested water rights
may give rise to takings claims. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
127. Estate ofHage, 810 F.3d at 717 (emphasis supplied).
128. Blumm & Jamin, supra note 38, at 814.
129. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542 (1976) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17).
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
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federal purposes, including locks and dams, national parks, and national
forests.131
Congress's power over acquired federal enclaves is highly nuanced. In general,
if the state expressly cedes jurisdiction to an enclave purchased by the United
States, then the United States exercises all legislative powers over the parcel to
the exclusion of state authority.132 Otherwise, the federal and state governments
are free to make whatever jurisdictional arrangements they choose regarding nat-
ural resources, roads, and other civil and criminal laws.1 33 Once agreed upon,
states cannot unilaterally amend or cancel cession agreements.
1 34
A key distinction between the Property Clause and the Enclave Clause is that,
for land to come within the Enclave Clause, the affected state must consent.1 35 If
the state does give its consent to the United States to create an enclave, the
Enclave Clause, by its own terms, gives Congress exclusive legislative author-
ity. 136 On the vast majority of federal public lands (governed by the Property
Clause rather than the Enclave Clause), states may exercise jurisdiction over cer-
tain criminal and civil matters so long as the state action does not run afoul of the
federal Supremacy Clause.137 The inclusion of the Enclave Clause in Article I in
no way limits the United States' Article IV authority under the Property
Clause. 138
III. THE LAW OF PRIVATE INTERESTS IN PUBLIC LANDS AND RESOURCES
An examination of over a century of federal public lands management reveals
that existing users tend to dominate decisionmaking processes and outcomes.
1 39
One might ask whether this phenomenon is a necessary outcome of existing fed-
eral law (formal positive law) or whether it is attributable to something else. To
131. George Cameron Coggins & Robert Glicksman, Creation, 1 PUB. NAT. RES. L. § 3:7 (2d ed.
2017).
132. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 542; Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 532, 537-38
(1885).
133. Fort Leavenworth, 114 U.S. at 533-42; Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 542. As the Court explained in
Kleppe, "[T]he legislative jurisdiction acquired may range from exclusive federal jurisdiction with no
residual state police power, to concurrent, or partial, federal legislative jurisdiction, which may allow
the State to exercise certain authority." Id. See United States v. Parker, 36 F.Supp.3d 550, 575-76, 584-
85 (W.D.N.C. 2014) (holding that, where both the United States and North Carolina had concurrent
jurisdiction within a forest enclave, the federal court had authority over a prosecution for poaching).
134. United States v. Armstrong, 186 F.3d 1055, 1061 (8th Cir. 1999).
135. Appel, supra note 121, at 1 n.15.
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
137. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
138. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 541-43. See Robert L. Fischman & Jeremiah I. Williamson, The Story of
Kleppe v. New Mexico: The Sagebrush Rebellion as Un-Cooperative Federalism, 83 U. COLO. L. REV.
123, 156 (2011) (noting that no state consent is necessary with respect to lands governed by the Property
Clause; "the federal government possesses pre-emptive jurisdiction over the public domain under the
Property Clause even if it does not secure jurisdiction under the Enclave Clause").




show that the dominance exerted by existing users is, for the most part, due to
informal but deeply entrenched dynamics, i.e., what Professor Eisenberg calls a
"shadow system of operative law that functions alongside and often in contrast to
formal law,"140 this Part examines the statutes, regulations, and caselaw govern-
ing private interests in federal grazing permits and mineral leases. It compares
and contrasts these interests, which range from revocable licenses to legally pro-
tected contractual or other rights, with interests in federal lands and resources that
are treated by law as vested property rights, particularly, perfected hardrock min-
ing locations. The expectations underlying extra-legal private claims are explored
in Part IV.
A. GRAZING PERMITS
Federal law is explicit that grazing permits like those held by the Hammonds,
Hages, and Bundys provide a revocable license to use the federal lands under the
terms of the permit, but create no property rights in the land:
So far as consistent with the purposes and provisions of the subchapter, graz-
ing privileges recognized and acknowledged shall be adequately safeguarded,
but the creation of a grazing district or the issuance of a permit ... shall not
create any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands.14 1
As such, the United States can cancel or modify the permit without compensa-
tion for grass or the loss of value to the rancher's base property,142 but compensa-
tion generally is provided for certain types of range improvements, such as
corrals, loading chutes, and water tanks. 
143
Under the Taylor Grazing Act, as amended by FLPMA, cancellations are
authorized for violations of the permit or the grazing regulations, "during periods
of range depletion due to severe drought or other natural causes," and to devote
140. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 83.
141. 43 U.S.C. § 315b. See United States v. Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 2016) (a
grazing permit issued under § 315b "does not create any property rights").
142. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973); LaRue v. Udall, 324 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir.
1963). See Estate of Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 165-67 (1996) (finding that a grazing permit
was a revocable license, not a contract); Colvin Cattle Co., Inc. v. U.S., 468 F.3d 803 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
rehearing denied (2007) (rejecting rancher's argument that a water right included the right for cattle to
consume forage adjacent to the water).
143. See Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 750 (2000) (upholding regulation granting
the United States title to range improvements constructed under cooperative agreements with
permittees); 43 U.S.C. § 1752(g) (if the cancellation is to devote the land to another purpose, "the
permittee or lessee shall receive a reasonable compensation for the adjusted value of his interest in
authorized permanent improvements placed or constructed by the permittee or lessee on lands covered
by such permit or lease, but not to exceed the fair market value of the terminated portion of the
permittee's or lessee's interest therein").
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the lands covered by the permit or lease to another public purpose."'
Although the Taylor Grazing Act gives a preference to "owners of water or
water rights, as may be necessary to permit the proper use of lands, water or water
rights owned, occupied, or leased by them,'14s ranchers' arguments that state
sanctioned rights for stock-watering necessitate appurtenant rights to federal
grazing permits have met with rejection, virtually at every turn.146 Destruction of
the water right itself, on the other hand, may result in a viable takings claim.
147
With respect to the grazing permit, the Taylor Grazing Act provides that per-
mittees who remain in compliance with their permit and the grazing regulations
shall not be denied renewal if the "grazing unit" is given as collateral. 148 In prac-
tice, renewal of grazing permits has been "virtually automatic, so long as the per-
mittee retained control of base property. '149 Base property is defined by
regulation as land with sufficient forage and water to support livestock.50
Grazing without a permit, or in violation of the permit, is a trespass,151 which
Cliven Bundy discovered when the court granted summary judgment to the
144. 43 U.S.C. § 315b; 43 C.F.R. § 4170.1-1. For cancellations dictated by range conditions, "the
Secretary is authorized to remit, reduce, refund in whole or in part, or authorize postponement of
payment of grazing fees for such depletion period so long as the emergency exists." Id.
145. 43 U.S.C. § 315b.
146. See Estate of Hage v. United States, 687 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (reversing the lower court's
decision that the BLM's construction of fences around water sources and denial of access to stream
channels was a taking); Adam Schempp, At the Confluence of the Clean Water Act and Prior
Appropriation: The Challenge and Ways Forward, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10138, 10153
(2013) (identifying the lower court's decision in Hage as "a rare example of a water right taking"); John
Echeverria, Water, the Public Range, and the Takings Clause: Here We Go Again!, Nov. 22, 2017,
https://takingslitigation.com/2017/11/22/water-the-public-range-and-the-takings-clause-here-we-go-again/
("numerous courts have recognized [that] a public land rancher cannot use private water rights a  a bootstrap
to claim effective possession and control over the federal public lands themselves").
147. See Sacramento Grazing Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 135 F.Cl. 168, 207 (Fed. Cl. 2017)
(finding that U.S. had taken grazing permittees' vested right to use stock water within a federal allotment
by denying access to water sources within riparian exclosures set up to preserve endangered species).
But see Echeverria, Water, supra note 146 (critiquing Sacramento); A. Dan Tarlock, Takings, Water
Rights, and Climate Change, 36 VT. L. REv. 731, 746 (2012) ("The grazing-right cases confirm that
denial of a federal permit-which is a license, not a property right-that prohibits use of a water right is
not a taking because there is no deprivation of the water right because it may be transferred to other
users.").
148. 43 U.S.C. § 315b.
149. George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Grazing Permit Eligibility and Transfer, 3
PUB. NAT. RESOURCES L. § 33:12 (2nd ed.) (2016 update).
150. Id. (citing 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5). See 43 C.F.R. § 4110.2-1(a) (describing base property as
"capable of serving as a base of operations for livestock use of public lands within a grazing district").
151. 43 C.F.R. § 2920.1-2(a), (e); 43 C.F.R. § 4140.1(b)(1)(i). See United States v. Jones, 768 F.3d
1096 (10th Cir. 2014) (affirming guilty verdict against defendant who allowed livestock to graze on an
allotment of public land without authorization); Walker v. U.S., 79 Fed.Cl. 685 (Fed. Cl. 2008) (ranch
owners were not entitled to compensation when their permit was cancelled for failure to comply with its
terms).
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United States, and found no "legitimate dispute that Bundy has grazed his cattle
... without federal authorization. "152 Bundy's primary defense-that he United
States does not own the public lands in question-fell on deaf ears.5 3 Likewise,
the Hammonds' arson, which was a trespass and estruction of federal property,
was the subject of a successful prosecution.5 4 Why, then, were the Bundys and
so many other Malheur occupiers acquitted of criminal charges for trespassing on
the Refuge?5 5 Although the letter of the law fails to provide an adequate explana-
tion, extra-legal undercurrents may fill in the blanks, as described below in Part
IV.
B. MINERAL LEASES
Due in large part to "historical happenstance," federal minerals such as gold,
oil, gas, and coal are governed by different mineral allocation devices.5 6 Gold
and other hardrock minerals are covered by a frontier-style location system, while
fuels and other types of minerals are subject to more complex lease or sale
systems.
1. The Mineral Leasing Act
The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 ("MLA")"5 7 removed oil, gas, and several
other minerals from the location system of the General Mining Law of 1872 and
brought them under a leasing system.5 8 Perhaps more than any other federal
commodity program, federal mineral leasing parallels the private market, where
leases are structured to ensure diligent production and a revenue stream to the les-
sor by forcing the lessee to either drill or forfeit the lease.5 9 Over-exploitation
and monopolization of public resources were preeminent concerns at the time of
passage:
Conservation through control was the dominant theme of the debates. The
report on an earlier version of the bill that eventually became the Mineral
Leasing Act stated: "The legislation provided for herein, it is thought, will go a
long way toward ... reserv(ing) to the Government the right to supervise, con-
trol, and regulate the ... (development of natural resources), and prevent
152. United States v. Bundy, No. 2:12-cv-0804-LDG-GWF, 2013 WL 3463610, at *2 (D. Nev. July
9,2013).
153. Id. See also Cox v. U.S., 2017 WL 3167417 (D. Or. June 13, 2017) (dismissing complaint filed
by one of the criminal defendants in U.S. v. Bundy who sought to divest the U.S. of title and "recover"
lands within the Malheur Refuge for "the people of Harney County").
154. Wiles, supra note 10.
155. See supra notes 25-27.
156. George Cameron Coggins, NEPA and Private Rights in Public Mineral Resources: The Fee
Complex Relative?, 20 ENVTL. L. 649, 654 (1990).
157. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-196.
158. 30 U.S.C. § 22; Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 659 (19 8 0).
159. George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Oil and Gas Leasing in Federal Land
Management, 4 PUB. NAT. RES. L. § 39:28 (2d ed.) (2016 update).
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monopoly and waste and other lax methods that have grown up in the adminis-
tration of our public-land laws."160
Prior to enactment, in United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,161 the Supreme Court
upheld President Taft's decision to withdraw 3,041,000 acres in California and
Wyoming to conserve oil reserves for the U.S. Navy. At the time, the Mining
Law "permitted exploration and location without the payment of any sum, and as
title could be obtained for a merely nominal amount, many persons availed them-
selves of the provisions of the statute."'162 The rapid depletion of public reserves
gave rise to "an immediate necessity" to conserve an adequate supply of petro-
leum. 63 Just a few months after Taft's withdrawal, William Henshaw and others
entered upon a quarter section of public land in Wyoming, bored a well, discov-
ered oil, and assigned their interest to Midwest Oil, which proceeded to extract
some 50,000 barrels of oil. The United States filed suit to recover the land and to
obtain an accounting.64 The oil company argued that the President lacked power
to withdraw lands that had been open for exploration and development. Although
the arguments gained traction i the lower courts, the Supreme Court found that
the President had implied authority, with tacit agreement by Congress, for a mul-
titude of comparable orders over "every kind of land-mineral and nonmin-
eral.'" 6 That the withdrawal order "was not only useful to the public but did not
interfere with any vested right of the citizen" was not lost on the Court.
1 66
To safeguard the public's interest in conserving public lands and resources, the
MLA requires the BLM to regulate both mineral extraction and disturbance to
the surface estate.167 In an early test of the MLA, the Supreme Court upheld the
Secretary's decision to deny a prospecting permit on conservation grounds as an
exercise of "reasonable discretion" to "promote the public welfare.1 68 Years
160. Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 206, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 5.; H.R.Rep. No. 398, 66th Cong., 1st Sess.
12-13; H.R.Rep. No. 1138, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 19).
161. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
162. Id. at 465 (citing Act of February 11, 1897, 29 Stat. at L. 526, chap. 216, Comp. Stat. 1913, §
4635).
163. Id. at 467.
164. Id. at 465.
165. Id. at 469. "[T]he long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise
a presumption that the withdrawals had been made in pursuance of its consent or of a recognized
administrative power of the Executive in the management of the public lands." Id. at 474 (citing Butte
City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 126 (1905)).
166. See id. at 475 ("prior to the initiation of some right given by law, the citizen had no enforceable
interest in the public statute, and no private right in land which was the property of the people").
167. See 30 U.S.C. 226(g) (requiring the Secretary to "determine reclamation and other actions as
required in the interest of conservation of surface resources"); Bruce M. Pendery, BLM's Retained
Rights: How Requiring Environmental Protection Fulfills Oil and Gas Lease Obligations, 40 ENVTL. L.
599, 682 (2010) (analyzing BLM's duty to protect the environment during mineral development).
168. U.S. (ex rel. McLennan) v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 419 (1 9 3 1). The permit denial was issued
pursuant to a directive from President Hoover for "complete conservation of Government oil in this
administration." Wilbur v. U.S. (ex rel. Barton), 46 F.2d 217, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1930). "[T]he purpose of
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later, in Boesche v. Udall, the Court observed that the passage of the MLA was
intended "to expand, not contract, the Secretary's control over the mineral lands
of the United States."169 Accordingly, "a mineral lease does not give the lessee
anything approaching the full ownership of a fee patentee, nor does it convey an
unencumbered estate in the minerals."170 To the contrary, leases are subject "to
exacting restrictions and continuing supervision by the Secretary.'"171
Since 1920, Congress has returned to the issue of federal mineral leasing sev-
eral times.72 Most importantly for our purposes, in 1987, the leasing system was
overhauled by the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act
("FOOGLRA").173 FOOGLRA requires new leases to be offered through compet-
itive bidding, imposes minimum royalties and rentals, gives the Forest Service
veto power over leasing in national forests, and requires an approved plan of
operations and a reclamation bond before permission to drill may be granted.
174
The basic structure of the MLA regarding the loss of leases by forfeiture, can-
cellation, or termination remains intact despite the various amendments.17 An
additional safeguard for the public lands came in 1976, however, with the enact-
ment of FLPMA, which added a conservation-oriented layer to mineral develop-
ment by directing the Secretary of the Interior to "take any action necessary to
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the [public] lands. ,1 76 Neither the
Secretary of the Interior nor the courts seem to place much weight on this provi-
sion of FLPMA in the oil and gas leasing context, however, seemingly blurring
its requirement with the balancing required under FLPMA's multiple-use sus-
tained-yield principle. 77
Any emphasis on preventing degradation and promoting conservation and
other public interests in the public's mineral estate and overlying public lands
shrunk with the election of President Trump.1 78 One of his first executive orders
was designed to promote "American Energy Dominance" by slashing regulatory
such withdrawal was to meet conditions due to great overproduction and to conserve oil and gas in the
public interest." Id. at 219.
169. Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472,481 (1963).
170. Id. at 478.
171. Id. at 477-78.
172. Notable reforms created separate systems for coal, 30 U.S.C. §§ 201-209, §§ 1201-1328, and for
geothermal steam, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001 -1028.
173. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987), codified in part at 30 U.S.C. § 188, 195,226.
174. Id.
175. 30 U.S.C. § 188.
176. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).
177. See Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P'ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(upholding BLM's decision to allow additional natural gas extraction while implementing "significant
measures" to mitigate degradation to recreational uses and sage grouse); Biodiversity Conservation
Alliance, 174 I.B.L.A. 1, 5-6 (2008) (interpreting "unnecessary or undue degradation" as "something
more than the usual effects anticipated" from appropriately mitigated development).
178. Michael C. Blumm & Olivier Jamin, The Trump Public Lands Revolution: Refining the
"Public" in Public Land Law, 48 ENVTL. L. 311 (2018).
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impediments to development on the public lands.179 Secretary Zinke followed
suit with a Secretarial Order proclaiming that, "[flor too long, America has been
held back by burdensome regulations on our energy industry.""18 It establishes an
energy counselor devoted to "resolving obstacles to energy exploration, develop-
ment, production, and transportation concerns."' 1 Conservation groups criticize
these orders for ignoring the other values of public lands and for "providing
unfettered access for energy industry ... while excluding people who focus on
the public's interests in fair return and responsible development."'182
Executive and Secretarial Orders cannot change the terms of the MLA and
other federal public lands statutes; only Congress can do that.183 The MLA is
designed to promote production, but also to conserve resources and the public
lands.184 Accordingly, if the lessee fails to comply with any of the lease provi-
sions, Section 31 authorizes cancellation unless the leasehold contains a well ca-
pable of production in paying quantities.185 Moreover, forfeiture may occur
whenever the lessee fails to comply with the MLA, the regulations, or certain
terms of the lease designed to prevent waste and monopoly.186 Finally, non-
producing leases automatically terminate by operation f law if the lessee fails to
pay rental fees on time.187 These provisions establish the playing field for
Solenex, Moncrief, and other lessees.
2. Solenex and Moncrief
With respect to Solenex and Moncrief, in addition to specific statutory provi-
sions on cancellation and forfeiture during the life of the lease, the Secretary
retains "traditional administrative authority to cancel on the basis of pre-lease
factors." '188 For this and other reasons, Professors Coggins and Glicksman
179. E.O. 13783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093
(March 31, 2017). See Blumm & Jamin, supra note 178, at 366 (stating that the Trump Administration
seems "determined to chart a substantial privatization of public land law in pursuit of 'energy
dominance"').
180. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, OFF. OF THE SEC'Y OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER No. 3351,
STRENGTHENING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR'S ENERGY PORTFOLIO (2017).
181. Id. at § 4(c)(4).
182. Pamela King, Adviser Who Shaped 'Energy Dominance' Agenda Heads for Exit, ENERGYWIRE,
(Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2018/08/24/stories/1060095157 (quoting Pam
Eaton, energy adviser for the Wilderness Society). See Blumm & Jamin, supra note 178, at 366-67
(criticizing Trump's reforms for elevating "certain privileged public land users-especially fossil fuel
producers-over non-extractive users, providing them a kind of monopoly position").
183. Erica Newland, Executive Orders in Court, 124 YALE L.J. 2026, 2066 (2015).
184. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21a, 226(m) (2006).
185. 30 U.S.C. § 188(b) (2000).
186. 30 U.S.C. § 188(a) (2000). See 30 U.S.C. § 184(k)(2006) (forfeiture for violation of provisions
against unlawful trusts and restraint of trade); 30 U.S.C. § 225 (2006) (forfeiture for violations of lease
terms respecting waste).
187. 30 U.S.C. § 188(b).
188. Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 478-79 (1963); id. at 483 (overruling Pan American v. Pierson,
284 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1960)). See Winkler v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 707, 711 (10th Cir. 1980) ("The
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characterize a federal lease as a "far more fragile property interest" than hardrock
mining claims.18 9 They point out that mineral leasing is "premised on secretarial
discretion in opening lands to leasing and in drafting lease conditions,' 190 and
that "leases expire every day for multitudes of reasons."' 9 Also, because the
BLM retains discretion at various stages of the leasing decision, NEPA has
broad-sweeping implications. As Coggins explains, "NEPA has severely eroded
the traditionally assumed nature of property rights in federal mineral leases,192
and has effectively "transformed the private expectations of those who wish to
obtain federal mineral rights."' 93
The nature of the lessee's interest turns in part on the inclusion of No Surface
Occupancy ("NSO") conditions within the lease. NSO conditions are required to
avoid impacts on surface resources, including historic or cultural resources, listed
or sensitive plant and wildlife species, fisheries, wetlands, steep slopes, wilder-
ness, and recreation areas. 9' NSO leases authorize the BLM to preclude surface
disturbing activities entirely. 9 "The lessee does not obtain a true property inter-
est in underlying minerals when it receives the [NSO] lease; rather, it gets only
the exclusive procedural right to seek further clearance for exploration and pro-
duction.'" 6 Much like a "right of first refusal,'" 7 NSO leases are not "an irre-
versible and irretrievable commitment" because the United States retains
authority, post-issuance, "to condition, and even to deny, a lessee the use of the
leased property."' 98
Secretary has broad authority to cancel oil and gas leases for violations of the MLA... as well as for
administrative errors committed before the lease was issued."); Griffin & Griffin Expl., LLC v. United
States, 116 Fed. Cl. 163, 176 (2014) (recognizing the Secretary's authority to "correct the mistakes of
his subordinates" by cancelling a lease that was invalidly issued); Grynberg v. Kempthorne, No. 06-cv-
01878, 2008 WL 2445564, at *4 (D. Colo. June 16, 2008) (finding authority to cancel a lease that was
issued without the requisite Forest Service review).
189. Coggins & Glicksman, supra note 149, at § 39:28. See George C. Coggins & Robert L.
Glicksman, Public Mineral Cases-The Threshold Definitional Question, 1 PUB. NAT. RES. L. § 4:23
(2016) (noting that takings claims can only be successful if the claimant has a property right, and
compiling cases on mining claims and oil, gas, and coal leases).
190. Id.
191. Coggins & Glicksman, supra note 149, at § 39:28.
192. Coggins, NEPA, supra note 156, at 661 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332).
193. Id. at 680.
194. See BLM, Summary of Oil and Gas Leasing Stipulations, https://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/
blm/mt/blm-programs/energy/oil-and-gas/leasing/lease-sales/2012.Par.44737.File.dat/masterstiplist-
April20l2.pdf (listing various NSO requirements). NSO leases typically require directional drilling
from outside the NSO boundaries. James B. Martin, The Interrelationships of the Mineral Lands
Leasing Act, the Wilderness Act, and the Endangered Species Act: A Conflict in Search of Resolution,
12 ENVTL. L. 363, 415 (1982).
195. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 937 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1153 (N.D.
Cal. 2013) (distinguishing NSO leases from non-NSO leases, which give BLM some ability to require
mitigation of significant environmental effects, but do not provide unilateral power to prevent drilling).
196. Coggins, NEPA, supra note 156, at 661.
197. Id.
198. Wyo. Outdoor Council v. Bosworth, 284 F.Supp.2d 81, 92,93 (D.D.C. 2003).
THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIEW
Non-NSO lessees, by contrast, limit the BLM's ability to protect surface
resources. Because a lessee's development activities cannot be completely pro-
hibited once a valid non-NSO lease has been issued, some courts have observed
that non-NSO leases should be treated as interests in real property.99 Similarly,
in Conner v. Burford, the Ninth Circuit noted that the issuance of a non-NSO
lease constitutes the "point of commitment" for NEPA purposes.0 0
Solenex holds a non-NSO lease, but the government argues that it is voidable
because it was issued in violation of at least two federal environmental laws.20
Specifically, the BLM failed to prepare an EIS, as required by NEPA, before issu-
ing the lease to Solenex's predecessor.20 2 By relinquishing its authority to pro-
hibit post-lease disturbance, the BLM made an "irrevocable commitment to
allow some surface disturbing activities ... without fully assessing the possible
environmental consequences.20 3 In addition, the BLM issued the lease without
consulting about the potential impacts on the Blackfeet Tribe's traditional cul-
tural resources within the Badger-Two Medicine area in violation of the
NHPA. 204 As the coup de grace, according to the United States, the congressional
withdrawal of the area in 2006 strips the BLM of any discretion to correct the
legal infirmities associated with issuance of the lease.205 It adds that, even if that
were not the case, the BLM would cancel the lease regardless, citing its authority
under the MLA, its traditional administrative authority over leasing, and the
Property Clause.20 6
For its part, Solenex contends that Section 31 of the MLA bars the BLM from
cancelling its lease on the basis of pre-lease factors.2° 7 However, the Supreme
199. See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 548, 552 (D. Wyo. 1978); Boatman v.
Andre, 44 Wyo. 352, 12 P.2d 370 (1932); Denver Joint Stock Land Bank of Denver v. Dixon, 122 P.2d
842 (Wyo. 1942).
200. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988). See New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v.
Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 718 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that the issuance of a lease without
an NSO stipulation is an irretrievable commitment, since the lessee subsequently cannot be prohibited
from surface use).
201. Federal Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 59, at 28.
202. Id.
203. Id at 27. The BLM prepared an EA when it issued the Solenex lease, and the government argues
that non-NSO leases such as Solenex's require an EIS. Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d
1409, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1988); Conner,
848 F.2d 1441).
204. Federal Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 59, at 35. The NHPA
imposes specific duties to consult with state and tribal historic preservation officers, to identify historic
and cultural resources, and to consider mitigation measures prior to issuing the lease. Id. (citing Pueblo
of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856, 862-63 (10th Cir. 1995)). See Ellen M. Gilmer, Where Oil and
Gas Meet Sacred Lands, Tribe Defends Last Stronghold, ENERGYWIRE (July 22, 2016), https://www.
eenews.net/energywire/2016/07/22/stories/1060040643 ("In a rush to produce domestic oil and gas in
the early 1980s... government officials failed to consult with the Blackfeet Nation.").
205. Federal Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 59, at 32.
206. Id.
207. Solenex's Consolidated Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and
Reply in Support of Solonex's Motion for Summary Judgment, Solenex LLC v. Jewell, 2016 WL
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Court appears to have closed that door in Boesche, when it stated that Section 31
"leaves unaffected the Secretary's traditional administrative authority to cancel
on the basis of pre-lease factors.'"208 Moreover, the MLA regulations explicitly
state that "[1]eases shall be subject to cancellation if improperly issued.
20 9
Solenex's estoppel arguments are problematic as well, because Solenex suf-
fered little harm. It had no legal or financial obligation to develop the lease since
its suspension in 1985, and it is entitled to a refund of amounts that it paid for the
lease.21° Solenex undoubtedly experienced some degree of aggravation, however.
As the district court found in its 2016 opinion, "No combination of excuses could
possibly justify such ineptitude or recalcitrance for such an epic period of
time."211
While mere annoyance does not rise to the level of legal entitlement through
estoppel,212 Judge Leon was persuaded that the government's disregard for the
company's reliance interests was arbitrary and capricious under the APA,
Boesche notwithstanding.213 According to the court, "the reasonableness of an
agency's decision to rescind a lease must be judged in light of the time that has
elapsed and the resulting reliance interests at stake. '214 Three decades was simply
too long, especially given that the United States had twice approved renewals and
had given no notice that the lease was invalid.215 In language rarely seen in fed-
eral caselaw, Judge Leon expressed unbridled outrage that the government had
pulled the rug out from under Solenex:
Federal defendants appear to argue that no time-period, however long, would
prove too attenuated to reconsider the issuance of a lease under newly dis-
covered legal theories. Horsefeathers! Even putting aside the thirty years
defendants supposedly spent trying to discover the lawfulness or unlawful-
ness of their own actions, this "wait and see" approach-though convenient
7438653 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 13-00993), 2016 WL 8928559 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 188); 30 U.S.C. §§ 188
(a), (b), 184(k), 225; Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472,476 (1963); Winkler v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 707, 711
(10th Cir. 1980); Griffin & Griffin Expl., LLC v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 163, 176 (2014); Grynberg
v. Kempthorne, No. 06-cv-01878, 2008 WL 2445564, at *4 (D. Colo. June 16, 2008).
208. 373 U.S. at 479.
209. 43 C.F.R. § 3108.3(d) (2011).
210. Federal Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 59, at 30. The refund
amounts to around $31,235, but Solenex claims that the lease is worth much more. Associated Press, The
Latest: Owner of Canceled Oil Lease Still Wants to Drill, DAILY HERALD (Mar. 26, 2016, 3:16 PM),
https://www.dailyherald.com/article/20160317/business/303179806.
211. Solenex LLC v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 83, 84 (D.D.C. 2015).
212. Robert Haskell Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in
the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 43 (1983).
213. Solenex LLC v. Jewell, 334 F. Supp. 3d 174, 182 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal pending sub nom,
Solenex v. Bernhardt, No.18-5343 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 28, 2018).
214. Id.
215. See id. ("An unreasonable amount of time to correct an alleged agency error, especially where
the record shows that error was readily discoverable from the beginning, violates the APA.") (emphasis
supplied).
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from a policy perspective-wreaks havoc on the interests of individual
leaseholders.2 16
As for Moncrief's lease, Judge Leon reached a similar result.2 17 In addition to
the government's arbitrary failure to consider the "substantial reliance interests at
play," Judge Leon also found that Moncrief was protected as a "bona fide pur-
chaser" under the MLA.21 In contrast to Solenex, Moncrief acquired its interest
in good faith, without notice of the violation, for valuable consideration.2 9
Furthermore, when Moncrief purchased the lease, it had in hand a letter from
Interior explicitly stating that the suspension was temporary.
220
The fate of both leases, and the Badger-Two Medicine area itself, continues to
hang in the balance. Although Judge Leon ordered a lease reinstatement, the
United States has lodged appeals.22 To the extent that the decision that the gov-
ernment arbitrarily undermined the companies' reliance interests is seen as a
backdoor means of finding estoppel, it may be vulnerable to reversal.222 Reliance
alone is not enough; estoppel turns in large part on the injured party's change in
position in reliance on another's act or omission.223 Although the Supreme Court
has applied the estoppel doctrine against state governments, "it has never
expressly applied the doctrine to the federal government.224 In fact, the Court
has reversed every single finding of estoppel against the federal government it
has ever eviewed.225
216. Id. at 183-4 (emphasis supplied).
217. Moncrief v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal pending, 18-5341
(Nov. 28, 2018).
218. Id. at 10.
219. Id. (citing 30 U.S.C. § 184(h)(2); 43 C.F.R. § 3108.4 (2009)). Moncrief bought the lease in 1989
from its predecessor ARCO "for 'substantial consideration"'; ARCO purchased it in 1983 for $1.3 million.
Id. at 4. By contrast, Solenex's predecessor, Fina, received the lease from Sidney Longwell, who reserved
a production payment to be paid as a percentage of the value of the oil and gas produced from the leased
lands. Fina eventually assigned the lease back to Longwell, who in turn assigned it o Solenex in 2004.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Solenex
LLC v. Jewell, 2016 WL 8928560 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 13-00993). The court did not reach Solenex's bona
fide purchaser argument. Solenex, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 184.
220. Moncrief, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 10 (citing 6/1/88 DOI Letter to ARCO).
221. Solenex LLC v. Bernhardt, No.18-5343 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 28, 2018). The U.S. subsequently
dropped its appeal in the Moncrief case, but the intervenors have not. Patrick Reilly, Government,
Earthjustice Appeal Badger-Two Medicine Drilling Lease Cases, MSSOULIAN (Apr. 6, 2019).
222. See Board of County Comm'rs of Adams v. Isaac, 18 F.3d 1492, 1498 (10th Cir.1994) (noting
that estoppel against the U.S. is an "extraordinary remedy"). Cf. United States v. Bundy, No. 2:98-CV-
00531, 2018 WL 3390182, at *5 (D. Nev. July 12, 2018) (rejecting Cliven Bundy's estoppel defense).
223. See Tracy Bateman Farrell, J.D. et al., Statute of Frauds § 453: Elements of, and Requisites for,
Estoppel, 73 AM. JUR. (2d ed. 2019) ("The doctrine of estoppel to assert the Statute of Frauds applies
where an unconscionable injury would result from denying enforcement of the oral contract after one
party has been induced by the other seriously to change his or her position in reliance on the contract")
(emphasis added).
224. Haggart v. Woodley, 809 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2509 (20 16).
225. Off. of Pers. Mgmt v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 422 (1990). See Atchee CBM, LLC, et al., 183
IBLA 389, 409-10 (2013) (rejecting an estoppel argument after the BLM determined that a lease had
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Chronicling the various arguments in the Badger-Two Medicine cases illus-
trates that, while mineral lessees do have more black letter law weighing in their
favor than grazing permittees, it is far from clear that Solenex and Moncrief hold
valid leases that entitle them to mineral development. Importantly, the claims
that Solenex chose not to raise are at least as notable as those that it did. Solenex
did not allege breach of contract or deprivation of property rights under the Fifth
Amendment,226 either because it did not wish to proceed in the Court of Claims
as required by the Tucker Act, or because of the relative lack of merit to those
claims, or both.227
So, there is much more to the controversy than meets the eye. Why are the
companies up in arms over cancellations in an area that would likely be difficult
to develop under the best of circumstances?228 Why has Judge Leon taken such
umbrage with the cancellations? As with the other types of claimants, the extra-
legal subtext may shed light on the broader picture.2 29
C. HARDROCK MINING CLAIMS
Sugar Pine Mine is in a unique position with respect to its asserted property
rights in comparison to the other claimants addressed in this article. The mineral
leasing laws are in marked contrast to the interest of a hardrock miner with a per-
fected claim under the Mining Law of 1872:
[W]hen the location of a mining claim is perfected under the law, it has the
effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive pos-
session. The claim is property in the fullest sense of that term; and may be
sold, transferred, mortgaged, and inherited without infringing any right or title
of the United States.230
In order to obtain a legally recognized interest in hardrock minerals found on
public lands, a person must comply with the requirements of the Mining Law,231
expired by operation of law in the absence of production as the claimants sought to use the remedy to
secure a right not granted to them by law); Bischoff v. Glickman, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1232 (D. Wyo.
1999), affd, 216 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that, "as a matter of law, reliance on the erroneous
advice of a government agent is insufficient to support an estoppel claim"); United States v. Bundy, No.
2:98-CV-00531 -LRH-VCF, 2018 WL 3390182, at *5 (D. Nev. July 12, 2018).
226. Solenex LLC v. Sally Jewell, et al., 2016 WL 8928559 (D.D.C.).
227. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000).
228. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting that Devon Energy accepted refunds when its
leases were cancelled because, as Devon President said, cancellation "was the right thing to do").
229. See infra Part IV.
230. Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 478 n.7 (citing Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280
U.S. 306, 316 (1930)). See Coggins, NEPA, supra note 156, at 660 ("Private rights to public minerals are
unlike standard private property because the process of acquisition starts with title in the United
States.").
231. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2006).
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which has remained largely unchanged since it was passed a century and a half
ago.232 Under the Mining Law, mineral deposits "in lands belonging to the
United States ... shall be free and open to exploration and purchase."'233
Developing a right to mine hinges on two fundamental requirements-location
and discovery. 4 Satisfaction of both entitles a miner to an unpatented mining
claim.235 So long as a valid claim is recorded with a location fee, and an annual
fee is paid, the holder of an unpatented mining claim may either remove and sell
the minerals without payment to the United States, or sit on the unworked claim
indefinitely.236
Locations may only occur on the "public domain," consisting of public lands
open to entry and settlement (generally, land within the western states over which
the United States acquired title and sovereign jurisdiction prior to the creation of
states).237 This applies only to federal lands that have not been appropriated, re-
served for non-mining purposes, or withdrawn from the location system.238 New
mining claims cannot be located on lands previously withdrawn and are null and
void ab initio.239 Pre-existing claims that fail to satisfy all applicable require-
ments prior to the withdrawal are void.240 However, valid existing rights are
grandfathered.241
The Mining Law provides that "all valuable mineral deposits" may be
located.242 For a mineral to be locatable, it cannot be common, nor can it be leas-
able nor salable under other federal acts, such as the Mineral Leasing Act.243
232. Id. Notable reforms include removal of oil and other fuels. See supra Part III.B. 1 (describing the
Mineral Leasing Act).
233. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2006).
234. JAN C. LATOS & SANDRA B. ZELLMER, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW HORNBOOK 370 (2015).
235. Id. at 371.
236. 30 U.S.C. §§ 28g, 28f. Occupancy is limited to activities related to prospecting and mining. See
infra notes 249-253 and accompanying text.
237. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922); Pathfinder Mines v. Hodel, 811 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir.
1987).
238. See National Mining Association v. Zinke, 877 F.3d 845, 869 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming U.S.
decision to withdraw over one million acres of public lands around Grand Canyon National Park from new
mining claims to protect tribal cultural resources, visual resources, and wildlife); Havasupai Tribe v.
Provencio, 876 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2017) (upholding agency's determination that Energy Fuels Resources
had developed a valid existing right, prior to withdrawal, to operate a uranium mine within the area).
239. See, e.g., Conner v. Department of Interior, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Nev. 1999); Kosanke v.
Department of Interior, 144 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Mac A. Stevens, 83 I.B.L.A. 164 (1984); Russell
Hoffman, 84 I.B.L.A. 508 (1985).
240. See Swanson v. Babbitt, 3 F.3d 1348, 1352 (9th Cir. 1993) ("until Swanson's patent was
actually issued, the government retained broad authority to remove those public lands from mining
claims and patents").
241. N. Alaska Env. Center v. Lujan, 872 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1989). See Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan,
937 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that oil shale was locatable if discovered before passage of the
1920 Mineral Leasing Act).
242. 30 U.S.C. § 22.
243. 43 CFR § 3830.11 (2 0 0 7). The Acquired Lands Act of 1947 removed from location all minerals
on lands the United States acquired by gift, purchase, exchange, or condemnation. 30 U.S.C. § § 351-
360.
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Perfecting a mining claim requires a "discovery," which means a deposit of a
character that a person "of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further ex-
penditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect of success, in devel-
oping a valuable mine."244 A prudent person is deemed willing to develop only
those minerals that can be extracted and sold in an existing market at a profit.
245
When acts of location are completed and a valid discovery has been made, the
miner acquires a perfected unpatented mining claim, a "unique form of prop-
erty,' 241 which is a "distinct but qualified" less-than-fee interest.247 Holders of
unpatented claims have the right to access the claim, to possess the surface within
the boundaries of the location, to remove ore from veins and lodes, and to sell ore
without payment of royalties.
248
Although the holder of an unpatented claim has a legally protected posses-
sory right to the minerals, this right is subject to the paramount ownership
rights of the United States to the surface estate.249 As such, unpatented mining
claims must comply with subsequently-imposed regulations, such as environ-
mental requirements.25O
The passage of FLPMA in 1976 added a conservation-oriented layer to mineral
development by directing the Secretary of the Interior to "take any action neces-
sary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the [public] lands. '251 The
BLM's interpretation of "unnecessary or undue degradation" has varied over the
years.252 Currently, its regulations authorize activities undertaken by a miner if
they are what a "prudent operator" would implement (i.e., "necessary"), regard-
less of how degrading those activities may be, and provide BLM with the discre-
tion to prevent undue degradation through resource management plans,
performance standards, and federal and state environmental laws.253 A claimant
244. Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313 (1905).
245. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968).
246. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963).
247. Reoforce, Inc. v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 1, 6 (2013) (citing Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Smith,
249 U.S. 337, 349 (1919); Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932, 936 (Fed.Cir.1984)). See United States
v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 1999) (the owner of a perfected mining claim is not a "mere social
guest"); Kunkes v. United States, 78 F.3d 1549, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (unpatented claims are possessory
rights).
248. Hydro Resources Corp. v. Gray, 173 P.3d 749 (N.M. 2007).
249. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985); Precious Offerings Mineral Exchange v. McLain,
194 P.3d 455 (Colo. App. 2008).
250. See, e.g., Public Lands for the People v. U.S. Dept. of Agri., 697 F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th Cir.
2012); U.S. v. Doremus, 888 F.2d 630, 632-33 (9th Cir.1989); Karuk Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 681
F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2011). See also Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d 468, 477-78
(9th Cir. 2000) (Forest Service is not required to select the most environmentally preferable alternative,
but must protect surface resources through "reasonable regulations which do not impermissibly
encroach upon the right to the use and enjoyment of placer claims for mining purposes") (citing U.S. v.
Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999)).
251. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).
252. Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2003).
253. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.415.
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does not have a compensable property right to have a plan of operations approved
for mining operations if the plan fails to satisfy the regulatory requirements.4
Most relevant to the Sugar Pine Mine, the BLM has issued regulations to
restrict the unlawful use and occupancy of mining claims. These regulations
forbid unauthorized residences, non-mining commercial operations, illegal activ-
ities, and speculative activities not related to mining. 6 Similarly, the 1955
Surface Resources Act limits the use of the surface to activities "reasonably inci-
dent" to mining operations, and otherwise retains use of the surface for the
United States and its permittees.25 7
If BLM determines that an unlawful use exists, it may issue an immediate sus-
pension order, cessation order, or notice of noncompliance, as it did with respect
to Sugar Pine Mine.25 8 With a valid location and discovery, Barclay and Backes
would have a right to mine their valuable mineral deposit, but not to maintain
noncomplying structures or activities or to interfere with the public's right to
access surface resources for recreation and other lawful activities.2 5 9 The IBLA
ultimately found that the structures and activities on the Sugar Pine Mine claim
were unauthorized. It ordered the miners to cease their activities, to take correc-
tive action, and to remove noncomplying structures pending compliance with
regulations governing surface occupancy.260
IV. HISTORY, REPUBLICANISM, LIBERTARIANISM, AND ENDOWMENT
Given the extensive power of the Property Clause, and the corresponding
federal authority over federal public lands and resources, one cannot help but
wonder what countervailing influences motivate claimants like the Bundys,
the Hammonds, Solenex, Sugar Pine Mine, and their Sagebrush-Patriot sup-
porters, and why their claims gain public sympathy. As Professor Joseph Sax
said, "[e]ven interests that don't at all resemble ordinary property give rise to im-
portant values and expectations that cry for recognition, and sometimes get it. "261
254. See Reeves v. United States, 54 Fed.Cl. 652 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding BLM's disapproval of a
plan that did not comply with FLPMA's non-impairment standard for wilderness study areas).
255. 43 C.F.R. § 3715.
256. 43 C.F.R. § 3715.6(j). See United States v. Henderson, 243 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2001)
(upholding miner's conviction for maintaining open trenches and barriers).
257. 30 U.S.C. § 612(b).
258. 43 C.F.R. § 3715.7-1; see supra note 98 (describing the notice of noncompliance to Barclay and
Backes).
259. See United States v. Rizzinelli, 182 F. 675 (D. Idaho 1910) (upholding conviction for
maintaining saloons on mining claims); United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, 611 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir.
1980) (holding that, absent material interference with mining activities, the general public has a right of
access to the unpatented claim for recreational uses).
260. George E. Backes & Rick Barclay, 193 IBLA 209 (Oct. 29, 2018).
261. Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 185, 187 (1980).
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This Part takes a brief look at the socio-economic underpinnings of claimants'
unyielding positions to better understand their tenacity despite the absence of sup-
porting law. The history of federal public lands, republican and libertarian impulses,
and the endowment effect help explain their position, the reinvigorated Sagebrush-
Patriot movement, and the relatively widespread public support for them.
As for public lands history, Bruce Huber explains, "[o]ccupants of the public
lands had little reason to fear ejectment, whether because of hard law, administra-
tive lenience, or simple ignorance on the part of the federal landlord as to their oc-
cupancy. '262 The idea-indeed, the objective-throughout the late eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries was to get public lands into private hands to pay off fed-
eral debts, encourage settlement, protect our ever-expanding but sparsely popu-
lated boundaries from hostile nations, and promote strong state governments.263
Federal giveaways for below-market (or no) cost were the name of the game,
from the Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787264 through the Taylor Grazing
Act of 1934 (and arguably even to the 1976 enactment of FLPMA).261 Various
federal land disposal aws transferred public lands into private ownership as fast
as possible. And as Huber notes, "[w]here the law wasn't fast enough, lawless-
ness was faster; squatters, timber thieves, and countless others took advantage of
the near-total absence of government oversight of the frontier.
266
Federal land managers did little to curtail the abuses, emboldening and even
rewarding squatters.267 It is hard to deny: "The durability of private claims to pub-
lic natural resources is in part the ongoing legacy of early developments in
American history.' '26' The Lords of Yesterday continue to hold an iron grip on
federal policy, and even more so on the public imagination.269
262. Huber, Durability, supra note 139, at 1026.
263. See id. at 1022 n. 156 (observing that the "federal government in particular was to be a
government of strictly limited powers, and federal land ownership conflicted with understandings of
state sovereignty"). See also Babbitt, supra note 37, at 848 (accounts of states' rights, federalism, and
public lands); Carolyn M. Landever, Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New Federalism
and State Jurisdiction on Public Lands, 47 FLA. L. REV. 557 (1995); Robert L. Fischman & Jeremiah I.
Williamson, The Story of Kleppe v. New Mexico: The Sagebrush Rebellion s Un-Cooperative
Federalism, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 123 (2011).
264. Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, reprinted in 1 U.S. Code, at LV-LVII.
265. See Pub. L. 73-482, June 28, 1934, ch. 865, § 1, 48 Stat. 1269 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315);
Pub. L. 94-579, title I, § 102, Oct. 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 2744 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1)).
266. Huber, Durability, supra note 139, at 1021.
267. See id. at 1024 ("So well-known were the numerous ways of circumventing the terms of the
Homestead Act that they reached even the pages of The Little House on the Prairie.").
268. Id. at 1021. Federal agencies foster unrealistic expectations through "lenience, non-
enforcement, and grandfathering" of historical patterns. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 84. For its part,
though, the Supreme Court has consistently refused to convert such expectations into legal rights. See,
e.g., Utah Power & Light v. U.S., 243 U.S. 389, 403 (1917) ("the power of Congress is exclusive and
that only through its exercise in some form can rights in lands belonging to the U.S. be acquired").
269. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF
THE WEST 20-21 (1992) (characterizing subsidized grazing, timber, mining, and dams as "Lords of
Yesterday").
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Carol Rose adds republicanism to the historic perspective.270 She demonstrates
that, unlike other kinds of public property, the federal public lands have unique
traits that lend themselves to private assertions of entitlements going well beyond
the letter of the law. Professor Rose emphasizes one of these characteristics: re-
publican concerns about he linkage between federal retention of the wealth of
public land holdings and the rise of a strong monarchy. Since the founding of our
nation, it has been thought that dispersing the public lands to private home-
steaders, railroads, and other owners would assure the political independence of
those owners, make the executive branch reliant on Congress for funds (as
opposed to being fiscally independent, which could lead to all sorts of mischief),
and ward off anything that approximated a royal domain in the United States.271
This theme, coupled with the quasi-reliance interests fostered by the lengthy
history of federal public land giveaways, handed down through generations of
public land users, carries a good deal of weight,272 but it does not provide a com-
plete picture of the deep-seated sentiments of individuals who exploit public
resources for private gain with little or no public benefit.
What, then, explains continuing largesse for private entitlements of public
lands users, when most Easterners, Midwesterners, and city-dwellers have little
to no access to the same wealth-enhancing benefits? There is a large fly in the
ointment of civic republicanism when entire groups are effectively disenfran-
chised. From the beginning of the republic, the populace feared monopolization
of land and resources almost as much as it feared Big Government, and this theme
finds its place in public lands policy.273 Even so, examples of public tolerance for
monopolization of public lands and resources abound. In particular, "leasing of
offshore oil and gas has virtually ignored antimonopoly principles, grazing per-
mits are almost invariably renewed, and policies aimed at promoting competition
in the award of park concessions have not borne much fruit." '274 The Trump
Administration has revitalized these themes by trumpeting America's Energy
Dominance and a platform aimed at obliterating obstacles to the development of
oil, gas, coal, and other commodities from the public lands.275
270. See Carol Rose, Claiming While Complaining on the Federal Public Lands: A Problem for
Public Property or a Special Case?, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 95 (2015).
271. Id. at 108.
272. See Robert Jerome Glennon, Federalism as a Regional Issue: "Get Out! And Give Us More
Money," 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 829, 842 (1996) ("Those who rail against the welfare system as a process that
enslaves ... generations of families, must eventually confront the reality that in the American West the
federal government has subsidized and made handsomely rich . . . logging families in the Pacific
Northwest, mining families and companies in Colorado, and ranching families in Arizona.").
273. See Huber, Durability, supra note 139, at 1021.
274. Blumm & Tebeau, supra note 38, at 215. See Huber, Durability, supra note 139, at 1004-05
(discussing federal acquiescence in perpetuating grazing permits) and 1011-1012 (describing how
leaseholders invoke voluntary suspensions and obtain extensions to stretch out their leases).
275. See supra notes 179-181; Robert L. Glicksman, Trump's Policies Blasting at the Foundations of
Conservation in Public Land Law, THE HIL (July 17, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-
environment/397282-trumps-policies-blasting-at-the-foundations-of-conservation-in; Eric Lipton &
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In addition to the legacy of public lands history, federalism, republicanism,
and rational self-interest,276 the "endowment effect" further helps explain why
private claims to public lands and resources continue to endure even when they
fall short of legally protected property interests. Drawing from cognitive psychol-
ogy and behavioral economics, this heuristic explains the human bias to hold
onto the initial endowment of resources, even if that allocation arose from squat-
ting or other extra-legal activities or processes.277 It also provides insights why
ranchers like the Hammonds and Bundys, and miners like Barclay and Backes,
gamer wide-spread empathy from libertarian and anti-government groups like
the Patriot Movement.
People tend to value something they have acquired-endowments-
significantly more than they did just before they acquired it "by virtue of the
mere fact of ownership.' 278 In short, losing what you have weighs more heav-
ily than gaining something new.279 This means that the initial distribution of
goods and development rights tends to be "sticky," and will not flow toward a
more efficient (or equitable) allocation, even if those making higher uses are
willing to pay top dollar.280
The human attachment to real property heightens the effect. As the Supreme
Court noted in a recent takings case, "property ownership empowers persons to
shape and to plan their own destiny in a world where governments are always ea-
ger to do so for them. 281 For its part, the law recognizes and even rewards this
Barry Meier, Under Trump, Coal Mining Gets New Life on U.S. Lands, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/06/us/politics/under-trump-coal-mining-gets-new-life-on-us-lands.
html. See also Blumm & Jamin, supra note 178, at 316 ("if the Trump revolution's efforts to increase
commodity production on federal public lands succeed, the result will mark a fundamentally
undemocratic redefinition of 'the public' in public land law").
276. Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why "Multiple Use" Failed,
18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 430 (1994) (attributing grazing and timber domination, at least in part, to
public choice theory and rent-seeking behavior on the commons).
277. Owen D. Jones & Sarah F. Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A New Theory of the
Endowment Effect, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1935, 1942 (2008). See Anupam Chander, The New, New
Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 715, 788 (2003) (explaining how loss aversion "encompasses the related
phenomena of the endowment effect and status quo bias").
278. Jones & Brosnan, supra note 277, at 1942.
279. Rose, supra note 270, at 105. See generally, MICHAEL LEWIS, THE UNDOING PROJECT (2016)
(cognitive bias); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1551, 1566 (1998) (noting that surveys about recreational public lands demonstrate "dramatic
endowment effects," as people demand much higher amounts to sell their rights to use the land than they
would offer to buy such rights).
280. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo
Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 204 (1991) ("A thing which you enjoyed and used as your own for a long
time, whether property or opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without your
resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it.") (citing Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897)).
281. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S.Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017).
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phenomenon through the doctrine of adverse possession (though t at doctrine
does not enable squatters to strip ownership from the government).282
The endowment effect helps explain why claimants fight for continuing access
and use rather than monetary damages, and why their occupancy generates public
sympathy.283 It plays a palpable role in the "stickiness" of private claims to public
lands and resources, such as those asserted by ranchers, like the Bundys and the
Hammonds, and miners, like Barclay and Backes. The endowment effect may
not go as far to explain Solenex's position because the company had barely occu-
pied the leasehold when the lease was cancelled.284 Still, Solenex and its prede-
cessor held the lease for over three decades, giving rise to investment interests
and, arguably, expectations in continued possession and eventual occupation.285
V. THE PUBLIC INTEREST RESPONSIBILITY TO THE PUBLIC FOR THE PUBLIC'S PUBLIC
LANDS
Having constitutional power over the federal public lands and resources is one
thing; exercising that power is quite another. While the federal power to maintain,
regulate, and protect the public lands and resources is clear, the federal govem-
ment's duty to do so is somewhat opaque. This Part illuminates the nature of that
duty by examining the Public Trust Doctrine ("PTD") and the public interest
standard. The PTD, standing alone, is not sufficient to promote the public's inter-
est in the public lands, nor is it a sufficient constraint on private interests or, for
that matter, the government itself. By the same token, the public interest standard,
standing alone, without some means of cabining agency discretion, is also not
sufficient. However, the two concepts gain strength, depth, and breadth from
each other. The public interest standard is a viable means of conceptualizing and
constraining private rights and conserving public lands and resources when the
PTD is employed as a complementary principle.
A. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The PTD has captivated and bewildered scholars and courts for centuries.
Simply put, the PTD is a common law doctrine that impresses a trust responsibil-
ity on the sovereign owner to manage and protect public rights to access and use
282. See Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. LJ. 2419, 2471
(2001); See also Alexandra B. Klass, Response Essay: The Personhood Rationale and Its Impact on the
Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, 103 GEO. L. J. ONLINE 41, 45 (2014) (assessing the
persistence of adverse possession claims in terms of personhood).
283. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1541, 1552 (1998). For illustrative cases, see 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal
v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing the effect in a case involving possession of drugs
for religious ceremonies); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (seeking
injunctive relief rather than damages for interference with the continued use and enjoyment of property).
284. See supra note 60-61 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
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286public trust resources. Members of the public can employ the judiciary to
enforce this responsibility against the sovereign.287 However, to date, the PTD's
potential for promoting conservation of federal public lands has been limited in
three ways. First, the PTD is primarily concerned with public access and use, not
conservation. Second, classic formulations of the PTD center on the shores and
beds of navigable and tidal waterways for navigation, fishing, and related uses,
and its application to upland areas is sketchy. Finally, the PTD is typically seen
as a state doctrine, having limited relevance for federal lands and resources.
1. Public Use, Not Conservation
Public rights of access and use are the hallmark of the PTD. "At its core," the
PTD protects public rights to use communal resources, including "the shore and
the bed of waterways, the rights of fishing and public access, and perhaps even
the right to the water itself for certain communal uses.'288 Professor Blumm
makes a cogent argument that "antimonopoly is the essence of the PTD, prevent-
ing privatization of certain resources used by the public, such as tidal waters and
wildlife." 28 9 This theme finds a strong parallel in public lands law, which encour-
ages multiple uses but not monopolization.2 90
In construing the PTD, a few courts have gone several steps farther, and found
that the rights of access and use ensured by the PTD include a right to conserve
the resources to be accessed.291 While this theory has intuitive merit-after all, a
right to access and use something is worth little if it can be destroyed-it has yet
to be widely adopted, and whatever parameters uch a right may have are
murky.
292
2. Navigable/Tidal Waters and Submerged Lands
The PTD has been applied, traditionally, to tidal waters, navigable waters, and
the lands underlying those waters.293 In addition, many states characterize
286. See Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. State of Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892).
287. See Center for Biological Diversity v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 601 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008).
288. Mark Squillace, Restoring the Public Interest in Western Water Law, U. of Colorado Law Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 18-32, at 14-15, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3246132.
289. Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen Moses, The Public Trust as an Antimonopoly Doctrine,
44 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2017).
290. Id.
291. See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016), motion to cert. appeal
denied, 2017 WL 2483705 (D. Or. 2017) (climate); Center for Biological Diversity, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
601 (birds); Kain v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 49 N.E.3d 1124, 1142 (Mass. 2016); Robinson Twp. v.
Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 930 (Pa. 2013) (the environment); State v. Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d
409,411 (Ohio 1974) (fish).
292. Robin Craig, Comparative Guide to the Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values,
Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L. Q. 71, 80-81 (2010).
293. Id.
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wildlife as a trust resource,2 94 but they tend to invoke the concept as a source of
ownership and power and not as a responsibility for stewardship.2 9 Some schol-
ars argue that the PTD should extend to other types of renewable resources to
reflect evolving and emerging public values uch as wildlife, climate, and ecosys-
tem services.296 If it did, the argument goes, the public would have a powerful
tool to force trustees to fulfill their conservation duties for a wide array of trust
resources through judicial recourse.297
Only a few state courts have embraced this theory. In National Audubon
Society v. Superior Court,298 the California Supreme Court invoked the PTD to
force the state water resources control board to consider the adverse ecological
impacts of withdrawals by the City of Los Angeles from tributaries feeding
Mono Lake. But the duty to consider meant just that-the board must consider
trust values and balance them against the value of appropriations.299 The
Hawaiian Supreme Court has taken the doctrine farther, stating that "the mainte-
nance of waters in their natural state constitutes a distinct 'use' under the water
resources trust," and imposing a duty on the water commission to safeguard the
trust in its decisionmaking.°°
This topic may be where the PTD has the most room to evolve and grow. As
New Deal advisor Walton Hamilton remarked, the "knack of putting up new
wine in old bottles" is one of the "most valuable tricks of the judicial trade.30 1
Forcing new concepts into old doctrines "may keep law backward by crowding
stuff of a newer world into an outworn term," yet, more optimistically, "it may
serve a living law by permitting a graceful accommodation of a vocabulary that
294. See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV.
1437, 1487 (2013) (cataloguing states' expressions of the wildlife trust in App. A-B).
295. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1895), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322 (1979); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,
400 (1948).
296. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 292, at 92; Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of
Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations: Ecological Realism
and the Needfor A Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 91 (2009).
297. Blumm & Paulsen, Public Trust in Wildlife, supra note 294, at 1488.
298. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
299. See id. at 712 (noting that the state's "prosperity and habitability ... requires the diversion of
great quantities of water from its streams," thus "[t]he state must have the power to grant nonvested
usufructuary rights to appropriate water even if diversions harm public trust uses"); see also Dave
Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1099, 1022-23 (2012) (arguing that the PTD has little impact on existing water uses despite serious
interference with trust values).
300. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 448 (Haw. 2000); In re Water Use Permit
Applications, 93 P.3d 643, 657 (Haw. 2004). These cases reflect a unique provision of HAWAII CONST.
art. XI § 1: "For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political subdivisions
shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, air,
minerals and energy sources ... All public natural resources are held in trust ... for the benefit of the
people."
301. Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089, 1091 (1930).
Professor Hamilton adds: "The practice of the judicial art could hardly go on without it." Id.
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endures to the shifting exigencies of a developing society."30 2 Extending the PTD
to renewable resources and even the atmosphere itself does not seem like such a
big stretch when faced with the exigencies of climate change and catastrophic
losses of biodiversity.3 °3
3. State, Not Federal
A handful of Supreme Court opinions indicate that the PTD is a matter of state,
rather than federal, principles,304 and "the public trust is neither a creature nor a
component of federal law. '305 Arguably, the PTD has scant space to operate on
federal lands, given that Congress retains explicit constitutional power to dispose
of them and to make "needful rules" for their management.30 6 Moreover, as
Professor Charles Wilkinson wrote, "The [federal] legislative matrix is suffi-
ciently comprehensive that doubts can fairly be raised as to whether there is room
for a broad, common law doctrine to operate. "307
Wilkinson acknowledged, however, that while not strictly applicable, "public
trust notions have charged and vitalized public land law, particularly in the mod-
em era."308 An important example can be seen in Juliana v. United States. There,
a district court held that child activists could bring a substantive due process-
public trust claim against the federal government for failing to address the
climate-destabilizing effects of greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels.309
302. See id. ("Its use is neither good nor bad in itself; it depends upon the crudeness or the skill, the
blindness or the awareness, with which the feat is accomplished.").
303. See Juliana v. U.S., 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018) (allowing due process and equal
protection claims to proceed against the U.S. for subsidizing fossil fuels, as such claims implicate a
violation of the alleged fundamental right to a climate system capable of sustaining life); In re U.S., 139
S. Ct. 452, 453 (2018) (denying petition for writ of mandamus). But see Chernaik v. Brown, 295 Or.
App. 584, 600 (Or. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that the PTD does not impose an affirmative duty on the
state to protect trust resources from climate change; rather, the PTD "is rooted in the idea that the state is
restrained from disposing or allowing uses of public-trust resources that substantially impair the
recognized public use of those resources") (emphasis supplied).
304. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453-54 (1892); Appleby v. New York, 271 U.S.
364, 395 n.13 (1926); PPL Mont., LLC v. Mont., 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012). See Phillips Petroleum v.
Miss., 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1998) ("it has been long established that the individual states have the
authority to define the limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands
as they see fit").
305. Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & Charting Its Future,
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 681 (2012) ("little progress has occurred over the past 30 years in making
federal resources and officers subject to the same, public -trust-based obligations that apply to state and
local governments in most American jurisdictions").
306. Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative
State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIz. ST. L.J. 941, 1033 (2000) (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2).
307. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIs L. REV.
269,276 (1980).
308. Id. at 278; See William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine as an Interpretive Canon, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 693, 699 (2 0 1 2) (demonstrating how the PTD could be expanded and given meaningful
contours when used as a canon of construction).
309. 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1259.
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The court followed the reasoning outlined in Kleppe v. New Mexico,31 ° which rec-
ognized sweeping federal power over public lands and resources. The Juliana
court noted that, in Kleppe, the Supreme Court "simply did not have before it the
question whether the Constitution grants the federal government unlimited
authority to do whatever it wants with any parcel of federal land, regardless of
whether its actions violate individual constitutional rights or run afoul of public
trust obligations."31 1 The Juliana court found that Kleppe supported, or at least
did not undermine, its conclusion that, "The federal government, like the states,
holds public assets-at a minimum, the territorial seas-in trust for the
people.
312
Whether Juliana is an outlier or a bellwether remains to be seen. Rather than
tackling the issues related to the PTD's application as a standard by which to curb
federal discretion, this Article rests on a more discrete premise: the PTD offers a
foundation for fleshing out the public interest standard applicable to federal pub-
lic lands and resources, and a means to "serve a living law by permitting a grace-
ful accommodation of a vocabulary that endures to the shifting exigencies of a
developing society.'
31 3
B. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IS DISTINCT FROM-YET INFORMED BY-THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE
It is not unusual for courts to conflate the two concepts of public interest and
the PTD, occasionally treating statutory public interest requirements as a vehicle
for satisfying the public trust.314 For instance, in Illinois Central, the Supreme
Court employed the phrase "public interest in the lands and waters remaining" to
describe the public trust in the submerged lands of Lake Michigan.315 This makes
it difficult to pinpoint the precise holding of these cases, but rather than vilifying
the convergence, the PTD should be used to inform the public interest standard
and to place parameters on its application.31 6 Importantly, the sovereign cannot
abdicate its fiduciary PTD duty, and any member of the public with standing can
310. 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976).
311. 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1259.
312. Id.
313. Hamilton, supra note 301, at 1092. For an example of a federal court applying something akin
to the PTD to constrain Interior's attempt to give away federal reserved water rights, see High Country
Citizens' All. v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1244 (D. Colo. 2006) (taking the U.S. to task because,
"[i]n their zeal to reach a resolution to the competing interests,... the Defendants ignore the fight of the
public").
314. See Michelle Bryan Mudd, Hitching Our Wagon to a Dim Star: Why Outmoded Water Codes
and "Public Interest" Review Cannot Protect the Public Trust in Western Water Law, 32 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 283, 312-14 (2013) (providing examples).
315. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453-54 (1 8 9 2).
316. See Squillace, supra note 288, at 15 (stating that public values can be protected "through either
or both the public trust doctrine and a public interest review").
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sue the sovereign to enforce that duty.317 The public interest standard can gain
traction through both facets of the PTD.
1. Different Foundations; Different Parameters; Complementary Principles
The PTD is a hallmark of "sovereign ownership," where the government has
legal title to the res but must manage it for the benefit of the public, who holds
beneficial title.318 The public interest arises from sovereign powers as well, but
instead of ownership, its basis is the police power to regulate private activities for
the good of the community.3 19 As such, the public interest standard arises from
positive law adopted by the legislature.
3 20
With the rapid industrialization of the late nineteenth century, "America's
increasingly complex society needed a land use system of greater efficiency and
vision than nuisance law. ' '1 The police power became the tool of choice for state
governments in their quest to advance important social and economic programs,
and courts generally upheld constraints on private property so long as there was a
clear public interest, even if it only benefited a discrete group of people rather
than the public at large.322 This trend triggered concerns about impacts o private
property, but courts tended to uphold governmental measures as long as they
were not exerted arbitrarily and the burdens imposed by them were accompanied
by reciprocal public benefits.323
While the PTD is of "ancient origin, 3 24 the public interest came to the fore in
the nineteenth century. It emerged in American courts around 1841, when the
317. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 601 (Ct. App. 2008);
Owsichek v. State Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488,495 (Alaska 1988).
318. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The
American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673, 677-79 (2005)
(distinguishing res publicae (things owned by the state), res communes (things owned in common, like
air and the sea), and res nullius (things owned by no one)).
319. Mark C. Christie, Economic Regulation in the United States: The Constitutional Framework, 40
U. RICH. L. REV. 949, 955-56 (2006); Mark W. Cordes, Property Rights and Land Use Controls:
Balancing Private and Public Interest, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 629, 640-41 (1999); Hamilton, supra note
301, at 1089-90, 1096; Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward
a New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 297, 300-01 (1990) (citing E. Freund, The
Police Power § 511 (1904)). See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (holding that, under
the police power, private interests must yield to the good of the community).
320. Squillace, supra note 288, at 15.
321. Coletta, supra note 319, at 316n.118.
322. Id. at 316; see, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 163 (1896) (finding that
land reclamation for irrigation was essential to community prosperity and thus may be mandated);
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 540 (1914) (stating that the validity of regulations
requiring a pillar of coal to be left to protect employees was "entirely settled" as "the proper subject of
regulation by the states in the exercise of the police power").
323. Coletta, supra note 319, at 317; see Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 410 (describing the police power as
"one of the most essential powers of government," justified by the "imperative necessity" of making
private interests that obstruct he "march... of progress.., yield to the good of the community").
324. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012).
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Alabama Supreme Court applied it to a dispute over the assize of bread.325 The
first time the Supreme Court relied on the "public interest" was in 1877, in a case
involving a challenge to legislative price-fixing of certain businesses, like grain
elevators and railroads, "affected with a public interest."3 6 That case, Munn v.
Illinois, held that private property, even that held in fee simple absolute, became
"clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public conse-
quence, and affect the community at large.327 The Court went on to say, "When,
therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he,
in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be con-
trolled by the public for the common good."'328 The public interest arose again in
1896 in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley,329 where the Court held that an irri-
gation project was "a matter of public interest" even if only certain landowners in
the irrigation district received project water.330 Statutory public interest require-
ments governing the use and allocation of water can be traced back to a flurry of
legislative activity in the states between 1890 and 1920.331
The public interest as a standard to measure the constitutionality of both legis-
lative and executive exercises of authority over private property and enterprise
began to take form in early twentieth century decisions.332 As with the PTD,
courts have struggled to define "public interest," but essentially, "the public inter-
est is the opposite of the interests of the trusts, barons, and corporate
lobbyists.333
325. Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137 (1841). The ordinance in question required "all bread to be made of
good and wholesome flour, and of such weight, as shall be from time to time prescribed." Id. at 137. It
was upheld, but the penalty of a fine "not exceeding $50" was void for uncertainty. Id. at 144.
326. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). See Hamilton, supra note 301, at 1092-93 (tracing the
origins of a narrower test, "affected with the public interest," as applied to price-fixing statutes to a
treatise penned by Sir Matthew Hale in 1676). Hamilton describes Munn as "an opinion marked rather
by commonsense than by clean cut reasoning," and describes the public interest standard at that time "at
best to be found only in embryo." Id. at 1096.
327. 94 U.S. at 126.
328. Id.
329. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161-62 (1896).
330. See id. at 161 ("To irrigate, and thus to bring into possible cultivation, these large masses of
otherwise worthless lands, would seem to be a public purpose, and a matter of public interest, not
confined to the landowners, or even to any one section of the state.").
331. Douglas L. Grant, Two Models of Public Interest Review of Water Allocation in the West, 9 U.
DENVER WATER L. REV. 485, 488 (2006) (citing Charles J. Meyers, A Historical and Functional
Analysis of the Appropriation System 10-15 (1971)).
332. See infra Part V.C.1. Examples include Midwest Oil v. U.S., 236 U.S. 459, 471 (1915)
(upholding the executive withdrawal of oil reserves because, "when it appeared that the public interest
would be served by withdrawing or reserving parts of the public domain, nothing was more natural than
to retain what the government already owned"), and Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 239-40
(1929) (noting that, while the phrase is "indefinite," to be "affected by the public interest" means that the
business or property is such that or is so employed "as to justify the conclusion that it has been devoted
to a public use and its use thereby in effect granted to the public").
333. PAUL J. CULHANE, PUBLIC LANDS POLITICS: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE ON THE FOREST
SERVICE AND THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 8 (1981) (citing Glendon Schubert, The 'Public
Interest' in Administration Decision Making: Theorem, Theosophy or Theory?, 51 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
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The public interest typically arises in the context of public deliberation and
participation during the administrative decision-making process, where the public
interest standard functions as a specific factor to be assessed in the allocation,
reallocation, and management of resources.334 By comparison, as a common law
doctrine, the PTD is advanced through litigation. As another point of conver-
gence, agency decisions made in derogation of either the PTD or the public inter-
est can be challenged in court if jurisdictional requirements of standing and the
like are met.335
2. Public Interest Lessons from Water Law
The public interest test found in many American water law regimes may be in-
structive as a means of ensuring that permittees, licensees, lessees, and other
users of the public lands only receive permission and usage rights if the public's
interest in conserving public resources and preventing private monopolization is
met.
Public interest standards can be found in both western and eastern water law
permitting programs.336 While some of the eastern programs are notable, most,
unlike western programs, are not viewed as property rights.337 For this reason, the
public interest standards found in the western programs of prior appropriation are
more relevant to the types of interests in federal public lands and resources
asserted by Sagebrush-Patriots.
In every western state except Colorado, the water permitting agency is author-
ized to condition or even reject applications for appropriations that fail to satisfy
the public interest standard.338 Public interest considerations are found in an array
346-68 (1957)). See Coggins, The Public Interest, supra note 8, at 3 (emphasizing that the public
interest is different than financial or political private interests).
334. Squillace, supra note 288, at 15.
335. See, e.g., Tulkisarmute Native Comty. v. Heinze, 898 P.2d 935, 952 (Alaska 1995); Shokal v.
Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 451 (Idaho 1985).
336. Robert Haskell Abrams, Legal Convergence of East and West in Contemporary American
Water Law, 42 ENVTL. L. 65, 84 (2012).
337. Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA. L. REV. 679, 681
(2008). A public interest standard can be found in other federal permitting regimes, "most notoriously"
the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309, oft accused of being hopelessly vague. Anthony E.
Varona, Toward a Broadband Public Interest Standard, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2009).
338. Douglas L. Grant, Public Interest Review of Water Right Allocation and Transfer in the West:
Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 681, 683-84 (1987). For relevant statutes, see ALASKA
STAT. ANN. § 46.15.080(b) (West 2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-155(A) (2019); CAL. WATER
CODE § 1255 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-203A(5)(e)(West 2018); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 533.370(2)(West 2017); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 61-04-06 (West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 537.153(2), 537.170 (West 2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-2A-9 (2018); TEX. WATER CODE
ANN. §§ 11.121, 5.271 (West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9 0.5 4 .0 2 0 (3) (West 2018). See also
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-5.1 (West 2019) ("public welfare"); UTAH CODE ANN. §73-3-8(1)(a)(iii) (West
2018) ("public welfare"); MONT. CODE ANN. §85-2-311 (West 2017) ("public welfare").
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of statutes and in several state constitutions.339
On paper, the public interest appears as an explicit factor to be considered by
the state water resources agency in its decisions to allocate and reallocate (change
or transfer) water resources.340 In practice, a permit to appropriate water is gener-
ally granted if there is water available and the applicant follows the prescribed
procedures of state law.341 Commentators have lamented that state agencies
rarely take action to prevent adverse impacts on public interest values in permit-
ting decisions, despite their authority to do so.342 Professor Squillace found that
"only two states - Washington and California - appear to consider the public in-
terest routinely in the consideration of water rights applications. ,
343
Even so, the public interest test in western water law can serve as a valuable
constraint on decisionmakers and applicants. On those rare occasions where state
agencies have denied permit applications because of adverse impacts on the pub-
lic interest, courts have been willing to uphold such decisions.344 Similarly, courts
have reversed agency decisions that failed to deny or condition permits as needed
to protect the public interest.345
Critics of the public interest, as applied in western water law, are correct in
pointing out that it is "highly discretionary, and responsive to changing political,
economic, and social priorities. '346 This is in part because state legislatures and
administrative agencies tend to define "public interest" with squashy, mostly util-
itarian definitions such as "maximizing overall wealth" and affording "the great-
est good to the greatest number.
347
339. See, e.g., Wyo. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (West, Westlaw through 2018); NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6
(West, Westlaw through 2018); CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 2019). See also
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(4) (West 2017) (authorizing water reservations for instream flows in the
public interest).
340. Grant, Public Interest Review, supra note 338, at 486; Grant, Two Models of Public Interest
Review of Water Allocation in the West, supra note 331, at 486.
341. Squillace, supra note 288, at 17; Mudd, supra note 314, at 307.
342. Reed D. Benson, Public on Paper: The Failure of Law to Protect Public Water Uses in the
Western United States, 1 INT'L J. RURAL L. & POL'Y 1, 11 (2011).
343. Squillace, supra note 288, at 27.
344. See, e.g., In re Hitchcock and Red Willow Irr. Dist., 410 N.W.2d 101 (1987) (affirming the
denial of a transbasin diversion under the public interest standard due to the lack of dependable flows
and adverse effects on wildlife in the basin of origin).
345. See, e.g., Tulkisarmute Native Comty v. Heinze, 898 P.2d 935, 952 (Alaska 1995). See also
Shokal v. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 340, 707 P.2d 441, 451 (1985) (permitting authority must account for
the public interest in the environment, wildlife, aesthetics, recreation, and alternative uses).
346. Mudd, supra note 314, at 307. Mudd observes that "legislatures and agencies can easily modify
public interest outcomes by favoring various economic or political interests, amending the substantive
and procedural requirements of public interest review, or deprioritizing the funding of public interest
review."
347. Squillace, supra note 288, at 5 (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 12 (J.H. Bums and H.L.A. Hart, eds., 1970)).
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Because it has been manipulated to serve private interests with profit-moti-
vated objectives and political ends,34 8 the "'public interest' is a fighting phrase to
many."34 9 Yet as Professor Coggins recognized years ago, "The public interest
standard ... is what government is all about.''3s° It is much more than "colliding
forces in a moral vacuum"; by definition, the public interest is not, and cannot be,
the same as pecuniary or political private interests.351 Beyond that, certain guide-
posts can be identified, but "like the law itself, the public interest is a continuing
search, a long-term effort to find a better resolution and then an even better
one.
352
One key aspect of states with meaningful public interest standards embedded
in their permitting programs is the recognition that a public interest servitude lim-
its every license, permit, contract, or lease of the public's water.35 3 Water may
still be used for private purposes, of course, but "the public deserves to be
engaged on all matters that may impact their shared use of a state's water resour-
ces. '' 35 Importantly, much like the PTD, the public interest reflects shared com-
munal values rather than profit-motivated values or other private enterprise.35 5
In addition to the explicit recognition that water is an essential public resource,
imprinted with a public servitude, some legislatures and agencies have given the
concept greater substance through detailed public interest criteria.35' The more
concrete the definition is, the more likely the public interest will be served
by ensuring that its application in individual cases leads to a transparent, non-
arbitrary result that promotes the "public, communal values that are typically
associated with our water resources."3' A laundry list of equally weighted crite-
ria may not be sufficient. Where the decisionmaker may choose from an array of
348. Id. at 8, 12 (noting that officials' views of the public interest may reflect self-interested political
ends and that "public choice theory predicts, with some reliability, that powerful and concentrated
private interests are likely to overwhelm the more diffuse public interest in civic engagement
processes"); Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why "Multiple Use"
Failed, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 405, 417 (1994) (noting that, under public choice theory, "the results
of the political process are the products of deals between self-interested actors who use public power to
further private ends," such that the public interest "is inevitably and persistently sacrificed due to the
power of organized special interests").
349. Coggins, supra note 8, at 23.
350. Id. at 24.
351. Id.; Culhane, supra note 333, at 8.
352. Coggins, supra note 8, at 24-25; Hamilton, supra note 301, at 1091.
353. Squillace, supra note 288, at 47.
354. Id. at 48.
355. See Culhane, supra note 333, at 8-9.
356. See Larry Myers, To Have Our Water and Use It Too: Why Colorado Water Law Needs A
Public Interest Standard, 87 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1041, 1096-97 (2 0 1 6) (assessing Alaska's multifactor
standard and arguing in favor of a legislatively defined public interest test).
357. Squillace, supra note 288, at 45.
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unweighted but competing and sometimes even conflicting factors, political influ-
ence and the decisionmaker's own subjective views are likely to rule the day. 8
C. PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS IN OVER A CENTURY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
How might the public's interests in intact, functioning ecosystems and sustain-
able resource management of public lands and resources take their place along-
side entrenched private interests in extractive uses? Professor Squillace's
observation about water applies with equal force in the context of public lands:
"With heightened awareness and some political pressure, the public interest may
yet prove to be the bulwark that protects our public [lands] for present and future
generations."35 9 The challenge is to recognize the public interest as a manage-
ment ethos, an analytical framework, and an enforceable standard for public lands
decision-making. Seeds of all three can be found in over a century of public lands
law.
1. Foundational Public Interest Requirements Leading to FLPMA
By the time FLPMA was enacted in 1976, the "public interest" was a common
concept in federal law.360 Long before FLPMA, federal land managers were
authorized to condition the private use of public lands in order to protect the pub-
lic interest.361
Although the public interest idea was alive prior to the adoption of FLPMA
and other 1970's vintage public lands laws and environmental laws, it was not
necessarily well. For one thing, as in other areas of American law, the concept
was poorly defined. In the early twentieth century, Gifford Pinchot, he first Chief
of the U.S. Forest Service, put it in the utilitarian terms that were prevalent among
conservation leaders at the time: "Where conflicting interests must be reconciled,
the question shall always be answered from the standpoint of the greatest good of
the greatest number in the long run." '362 This is not objectionable in and of itself,
but, as in the western water context, federal public lands and natural resources
law "historically equated the public interest with the economic exploitation and
358. Id. at 45. See Mudd, supra note 314, at 318 (arguing that giving public trust and non-trust
interests the same weight "undermines the paramount nature of the public trust").
359. Squillace, supra note 288, at 52.
360. Teresa Rice, Beyond Reserved Rights: Water Resource Protection for the Public Lands, 28
IDAHO L. REV. 715, 724-25 (1992).
361. See, e.g., Cominco American Inc., 26 IBLA 329, IBLA 76-361 (1976); Montana Power Co., 72
Interior Dec. 518 (1965). See also Grindstone Butte Project v. Kleppe, 638 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1981)
(upholding Interior's authority to impose public interest conditions under an 1891 statute governing
irrigation rights-of-way over federal lands).
362. CHAR MILLER, SEEKING THE GREATEST GOOD: THE CONSERVATION LEGACY OF GIFFORD
PINCHOT 45 (2013) (citing a letter drafted in 1905 by Pinchot but signed by Secretary James Wilson).
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development of natural resources."'363 Private use was often deemed the "greatest
good."
364
Several years prior to the enactment of FLPMA, the Public Land Law Review
Commission, a group of elected officials, land use managers, and public represen-
tatives charged with studying and improving federal policy, reported that the pub-
lic lands "would not serve the maximum public interest in private ownership.
36
However, the Commission also espoused a utilitarian, profit-maximizing view-
point with respect to minerals: "The public interest requires that individuals be
encouraged-not merely permitted-to look for minerals on the public lands. 366
Meanwhile, alongside the public interest stood the concept of "multiple use,"
described by former Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt as "the land of too
many users ... a facade to avoid decision making about where the public interests
lie. ' 367 In the past several decades, however, conservation, public participation,
and PTD principles have become a significant counterweight to utilitarianism and
multiple-use inclinations.368
2. The Continuing Public Interest Policies and Requirements of FLPMA
FLPMA, enacted around the same time as a veritable deluge of environmental
and public lands laws, is peppered with expressions of the public interest. The
very first provision of FLPMA explicitly states the congressional policy that "the
public lands be retained in Federal ownership, unless a a result of [land use plan-
ning], it is determined that disposal of a particular parcel will serve the public in-
terest. '369 Picking up on this theme, section 1716(a) of the Act permits the
Secretary to dispose of public lands in exchange for non-federal lands only on
condition that "the public interest will be well served by making the exchange.
370
363. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 178 (2004).
364. Id.
365. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, Final Report, One Third of the Nation's Land 6
(1970).
366. Id. at 125.
367. Bruce Babbitt, Keynote Address: Public Lands, Private Gains, 24 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 1,
6 (2004).
368. Id. See Samantha Hepburn, Public Resource Ownership and Community Engagement in a
Modern Energy Landscape, 34 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 379, 392 (2017) ("The increased connectivity
between ownership norms, ecological imperatives and market forces has fundamentally shifted public
interest beyond economic imperatives").
369. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1). In the same section, FLPMA also directs the BLM to consider the
"national interest" and the "nation's need" for resources. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(2). This provision may
lend support to the argument that the "public interest" is distinct from the "national interest." See Eric
Freyfogle, Federal Lands andLocal Communities, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 653, 679 (1985) (observing that the
Public Land Law Review Commission urged "clear consideration of the interests of both") (citing
Public Land Law Review Comm'n, One Third of the Nation's Lands 33-38 (1970)).
370. 43 U.S.C. § 1716(a) (emphasis added). This provision finds its roots in the Taylor Grazing Act
of 1934, which allowed the BLM's predecessor (the Grazing Service) to do land exchanges only if the
public interest would benefit. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-316. For further details, see Debra L. Donahue, Western
Grazing: The Capture of Grass, Ground, and Government, 35 ENVTL. L. 721, 806 (2005).
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In making this determination, FLPMA specifies that the Secretary "shall give full
consideration to better Federal land management and the needs of State and local
people."'371 It provides a non-exclusive, non-weighted list of public interest fac-
tors: "needs for lands for the economy, community expansion, recreation areas,
food, fiber, minerals, and fish and wildlife. 372
Prior to FLPMA's passage, in early disputes over land exchanges, agencies
argued that their public interest determinations were so discretionary that they
were not judicially reviewable, and some courts agreed.373 Even when courts did
review the determinations, they gave great deference to the agencies. In LaRue v.
Udall,374 a corporation proposed an exchange that would give it a large parcel of
land to test its rockets. The opponent, who was grazing cattle on the land to be
exchanged, argued that it could not be allowed, even for defense purposes, if it
destroyed a ranching operation. The court held that the public interest was not
limited to the conservation of rangelands; thus, the exchange was within the
Secretary's discretion.375
Since the passage of FLPMA, courts have consistently held that land exchange
decisions are reviewable.376 For example, an agency determination that the public
interest will be served by a land exchange may be "fatally flawed" if the future
use of the land is uncertain.7 This theme has carried over to the Alaska Native
Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 ("ANILCA") context, too, despite the
371. 43 U.S.C. § 1716(a) (emphasis added).
372. Id.
373. Scott K. Miller, Missing the Forest and the Trees: Lost Opportunities for Federal Land
Exchanges, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 197, 251-52 (2013) (citing Lewis v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 673, 677 (9th
Cir. 1970), and Sierra Club v. Hickel, 467 F.2d 1048, 1053 (6th Cir. 1962); Red Canyon Sheep Co. v.
Ickes, 98 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1938). Cf. Ness Inv. Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Agr., 512 F.2d 706, 715 (9th
Cir. 1975) (holding that the denial of a ski resort special use permit under a statute that "authorized" the
Secretary to issue permits "under such regulations as he may make and upon such terms and conditions
as he may deem proper," so long as the public was not precluded from forest access, was unreviewable).
374. 324 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 907 (1964).
375. Id. at 431.
376. George Cameron Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The Commons and
the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 77 (1982) (citing Lodge Tower Condo. Ass'n v. Lodge Props., Inc., 880
F. Supp. 1370 (D. Colo. 1995), affd, 85 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 1996); Nat'l Coal Ass'n v. Hodel, 675 F.
Supp. 1231 (D. Mont. 1987), affd on other grounds, 874 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1989); and Nat'l Audubon
Soc'y v. Hodel, 606 F. Supp. 825 (D. Alaska 1984)).
377. 43 U.S.C. § 1716(b). See Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 623 F.3d
633, 647 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that a land exchange with a mining company failed to satisfy the public
interest when the transferred lands could be mined with less regulation); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel,
606 F. Supp. 825, 835-38, 842 (D. Alaska 1984) (finding that a land exchange to promote oil
development was a "clear error of judgment" because wildlife and wilderness conservation objectives
would be undermined). See also Mendiboure Ranches, Inc., 90 IBLA 360, 365 (1986) (holding that the
public interest requires BLM to "assess the impact of proposed or anticipated development of the public
land once it passes out of Federal ownership, with consideration given to the need for appropriate
restrictions"); Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 450 ( 19 6 7) (finding that the Federal Power Commission
construed "public interest" too narrowly by failing to consider interests in preserving wild rivers,
wilderness, fish, and wildlife).
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lack of any particular factors in ANILCA's public interest provision.378 In
National Audubon Society v. Hodel, an exchange of lands within the Alaska
Maritime National Wildlife Refuge to promote oil development was a "clear error
of judgment" because wilderness and wildlife conservation values would be
undermined by the exchange.37 9
Decisions setting aside land exchanges are relatively rare, however. Courts
seem inclined to find FLPMA's public interest requirement satisfied when other
environmental statutes are satisfied,380 and when equal value is received as
required by section 1716(b).381
Although agency discretion continues to run high, FLPMA imposes outer pa-
rameters on that discretion.382 The express language of section 1716(a)-requiring
that the public interest be "well served" and also requiring "full consideration" of
statutory public interest benchmarks-establishes a preference for retaining public
lands, absent a clear showing that he public interest favors disposal.383 This is
powerful evidence of Congress' intent to strengthen the public's role and the pub-
lic interest consideration in land disposal decisions and land exchange practices.
378. See 16 U.S.C. § 3192(h)(1) ("Exchanges shall be on the basis of equal value ... except that if
the parties agree to an exchange and the Secretary determines it is in the public interest, such exchanges
may be made for other than equal value.").
379. 606 F. Supp. 825, 835-38, 842 (D. Alaska 1984). See also Friends of Alaska Nat'l Wildlife
Refuges v. Bernhardt, 2019 WL 1437596, at *10 (D. Alaska, Mar. 29, 2019) (finding that the Secretary's
decision to enter into a land exchange to facilitate construction of a road through the Izembek Wildlife
Refuge arbitrarily ignored the agency's prior determinations concerning the road's adverse
environmental impacts).
380. See, e.g., Shasta Resources Council v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 629 F.Supp.2d 1045, 1067
(E.D. Cal. 2009) (upholding BLM's consideration of alternatives and other factors under NEPA, such as
"the opportunity to achieve better management of [f]ederal lands," "protection of watersheds," and the
"expansion of communities"). See also Nat'l Coal Ass'n v. Hodel, 825 F.2d 523, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
("The Secretary's public interest determination is one involving a variety of factors, the relative weights
of which are left in his discretion."); Nat'l Coal Ass'n v. Hodel, 675 F. Supp. 1231, 1245 (D. Mont.
1987) ("At best, the Court can criticize only the form of the Secretary's analysis ... but will not pass
upon the wisdom of the agency's perception of where the public interest lies"), affd, 874 F.2d 661 (9th
Cir. 1989). Cf. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 805, 815 (9th Cir. 1999)
(remanding a transfer because the agency failed to analyze and minimize effects on an ancestral route
under NEPA and the NHPA; plaintiffs had initially asserted a FLPMA claim but did not appeal its
dismissal).
381. See Desert Citizens Against Pollution v. Bisson, 231 F.3d 1172, 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2000)
(setting aside a transfer of a "flagrantly undervalued" federal parcel to a private party for landfill
purposes).
382. See Bill Paul, Statutory Land Exchanges That Reflect "Appropriate" Value and "Well Serve"
the Public Interest, 27 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 107, 120 (2006). Paul attributes the failure to
honor the public interest to a failure of leadership rather than a failure of the public interest standard
itself. Id. at 121. For an in-depth assessment and criticism of land exchanges, see G.A.O., BLM AND THE
FOREST SERVICE: LAND EXCHANGES NEED TO REFLECT APPROPRIATE VALUE AND SERVE THE PUBLIC
INTEREST (June 7, 2000), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/rc00073.pdf (citing examples where agencies
ignored the required factors in making decisions to go forward with exchanges).
383. See supra notes 370-71 and accompanying text.
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This theory may have been tested by the new management plan for BLM lands
outside of the boundaries of the scaled-back Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument. BLM's preferred alternative identified 1,610 acres of federal public
lands for disposal.384 BLM's analysis stated that this alternative "would have the
greatest beneficial impacts" because it "conserves the least land area for physical,
biological, [sic] and ... is the least restrictive to energy and mineral develop-
ment."38 It is hard to see how an alternative that disposes of land that had been
earmarked for heightened protection through the previous monument designa-
tion, and that conserves the least amount of land for physical and biological val-
ues, could possibly qualify under section 1716(a), which requires consideration
of recreation, fish, and wildlife alongside minerals and economic interests.
386
Coupled with FLPMA's purposes to conserve public lands for the public, disposal
in this case would have been unlikely to withstand scrutiny.
3. Other Public Interest Responsibilities in FLPMA
Public interest responsibilities appear in other sections of FLPMA as well. In
its provisions related to rights-of-way over public lands, FLPMA permits canals,
ditches, pipelines, power lines, and "other necessary transportation r other sys-
tems or facilities which are in the public interest and which require rights-of-way
over, upon, under, or through such lands.387 FLPMA fleshes out the public inter-
est standard by requiring rights-of-way to contain terms and conditions "which
will" protect "scenic and esthetic values and fish and wildlife habitat and other-
wise protect the environment" and ensure compliance with state health and safety
standards.388 Additional terms and conditions as the Secretary "deems necessary"
include those that would protect federal property and economic interests, protect
other lawful users of the affected lands, protect the interests of local residents
who rely on fish and wildlife for subsistence purposes, cause the least damage to
the environment, and, finally, "otherwise protect the public interest in the lands
traversed by the right-of-way or adjacent thereto.
389
Notably, FLPMA section 1765(a) is a non-discretionary mandate to include
conditions "which will" protect "scenic and esthetic values and fish and wildlife
habitat and otherwise protect he environment" in order to safeguard the public
384. 83 Fed. Reg. 41108 (Aug. 17, 2018); see generally Scott Streater, Draft Management Plans
Promise 'Flexibility' for Utah, E&E NEWS (Aug. 15, 2018).
385. Michael Doyle, Interior Retreats on Land Sale Near Grand Staircase, E&E NEWS (Aug. 20,
2018). Mining proposals in the area formerly within the Monument are discussed at supra note 86.
386. 43 U.S.C. § 1716(a). In response to public outcry, the Secretary of Interior subsequently
directed BLM to modify its plan to omit the identification of any federal lands for disposal under
FLPMA. 83 Fed. Reg. 44659 (Aug. 31, 2018). Presumably, any future disposal proposal will occur in a
separate process.
387. 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a)(7).
388. 43 U.S.C. § 1765(a). Implementing regulations are found at 43 C.F.R. Part 2800.
389. 43 U.S.C. § 1765(b).
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interest.3 90 There is room for agency discretion, though, in determining the set of
additional factors "deem[ed] necessary" under section 1765(b), including the
final catch-all to "otherwise protect the public interest" in the land.391 Although
published opinions are few, one district court upheld the BLM's decision to grant
a right-of-way for a utility-scale wind project despite BLM's failure to require
turbine curtailment for red-tailed hawks and other raptors, given the implementa-
tion of mitigation measures recommended by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
and the State of California to minimize impacts on the birds.392
In addition to the applicable statutory factors applicable to rights-of-way, land
exchanges, and other dispositions, the Secretary's discretion is constrained by
the public interest objectives of FLPMA: retention of public lands; meaningful
opportunities for public involvement; receipt of fair market value for the use of
public lands and resources; comprehensive planning; and judicial review.3 93
Multiple-use sustained-yield is also an objective, but it is constrained by the other
specified purposes of FLPMA.3 94 These purposes include managing the public
lands "in a manner that will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ec-
ological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological
values; that, where appropriate, will preserve and protect certain public lands in
their natural condition; that will provide food and habitat for fish and wildlife and
domestic animals; and that will provide for outdoor recreation and human occu-
pancy and use."'395 In the Comb Wash grazing case, the IBLA enjoined BLM
from re-issuing permits on an allotment in Utah, and explicitly determined that
FLPMA's multiple-use mandate requires BLM to balance competing values to
ensure that the public lands are managed to "best meet the present and future
needs of the American people."'396
The Department of Interior's onshore oil and gas leasing program has not expe-
rienced a case similar to Comb Wash, or, for that matter, the Hammond and
Bundy cases, though the Solenex litigation may become such. Importantly, just
as it does in the grazing context, the Department has not only the authority but
390. 43 U.S.C. § 1765(a).
391. 43 U.S.C. § 1765(b).
392. Desert Protective Council v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 927 F. Supp. 2d 949, 975 (S.D. Cal.
2013), affd, 630 F. App'x 705 (9th Cir. 2015). See Robert L. Glicksman, Solar Energy Development on
the Federal Public Lands: Environmental Trade-Offs on the Road to a Lower-Carbon Future, 3 SAN
DIGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 107, 127, 132 (2012) (reviewing BLM's decisions to approve projects
as "in the public interest" when they complied with NEPA, the ESA, and the provisions of other
statutes).
393. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
394. See New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. BLM, 565 F.3d 683, 710 (10th Cir. 2009) ("It is past
doubt that the principle of multiple use does not require BLM to prioritize development over other
uses.").
395. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8)-(9).
396. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 140 IBLA 85, 101 ( 19 9 7). For details, see
Marya Torrez, Cows, Congress, and Climate Change: Authority and Responsibility for Federal
Agencies to End Grazing on Public Lands, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 22 (2012).
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also the statutory duty to protect surface resources and the environment during
mineral development.397 FLPMA's public interest requirements, with interstices
filled by the PTD, require no less.
CONCLUSION
After years of working tirelessly for grazing and mining reforms, former
Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt issued a clarion call: "[I]t's time to redraw fun-
damental premises of [private] assistance and favor conservation based on new
presumptions that public lands are for community public interests. '398
Expectations for private use of the public's lands and resources are often based
on past practices, psychological and political biases, and private economic objec-
tives rather than community public interests or, for that matter, vested property
rights. In many cases, the durability of grazing and mineral leasing claims rests
on perceptions about the relationship between individual rights, private property,
and the United States. These perceptions are deeply rooted in the history of fed-
eral land giveaways, Republican and Libertarian impulses, and the endowment
effect. The themes resonate not only with the claimants themselves, but also with
Sagebrush-Patriots and other sympathizers.
It does not require sweeping legal reforms to loosen the grip that private users
hold over public lands. Recognizing the complementary nature of the PTD and
the public interest does not even require a legislative fix. Rather, it requires
heightened appreciation for, and attention to, the nexus between the two, as
applied to federal public lands and resources, by private interests, public stake-
holders, federal decisionmakers, and the judiciary. For the majority of cases,
where claimants do not hold vested property rights, decisionmakers should only
validate private uses of the public's lands and resources if those private uses sat-
isfy public interest factors and are consistent with the PTD. When permits, leases,
and other authorizations fall short of the mark, courts are fully equipped to
remand them to the agencies for corrective action.
Federal land management agencies already have the duty to scrutinize applica-
tions for new permits or leases, and permit or lease renewals, to ensure satisfac-
tion of the public interest factors. They also have the authority to strictly enforce
the termination of expiring permits or leases when they no longer serve the public
interest. Expiring leases, licenses, and permits should not carry indefinite rights
to renewal via grandfathering, particularly after the public interest has demanded
that new claims of the same type cease to be granted. Not only should expiring
claims be allowed to expire, and land managers hould widely publicize the fact
397. 30 U.S.C. § 226(g); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). See Pendery, supra note 167, at 684 ("BLM has
substantial retained rights allowing it to protect the environment when oil and gas operations are
proposed on an onshore lease, and given the mandatory nature of many of the underlying authorities that
have been incorporated into the lease, it must fully exert those retained rights.").
398. Babbitt, Keynote Address, supra note 367, at 7.
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that they will expire at the end of their term, but requests for the renewal of exist-
ing leases, licenses, and permits should be closely examined to ensure that they
remain consistent with current federal law, policy, public interest factors, and the
PTD.
A convergence of the substantive and procedural aspects of the public interest
factors found in existing public lands law, as informed by the PTD, provides the
federal government with a powerful tool to manage trade-offs between private
and public demands more appropriately and to conserve the public's lands and
resources.

